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Abstract
This Article beings by sketching the background of the recent Rwandan Patriotic Front (”RPF”)
trial, focusing on domestic impunity for RPF crimes and strained relations between Rwanda and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (”ICTR”). It next describes and analyzes the
components of the ICTR-Rwanda agreement: the agreement itself, the RPF trial, and the ICTR
prosecutor’s assessment of the trial. The Article then explores the larger issues of prosecutorial
discretion and independence, complementarily, and victor’s justice, while examining the implications for the International Criminal Court (”ICC”).

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: WAR CRIMES
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LAW IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES
ARTICLE
“A MERE PRETENSE OF JUSTICE”:
COMPLEMENTARITY, SHAM TRIALS, AND
VICTOR’S JUSTICE AT THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL
Lars Waldorf 
“[T]he desire displayed by states to try their own defendants is often
inversely proportional to their ability or real desire to do so. What will
happen, then, in the context of [the International Criminal Court]
Statute that confers primary jurisdiction on the states?”
—Claude Jorda1
“This Tribunal must not be seen as victor’s justice when the history books
are written in fifteen years.”
—Erik Møse2
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), the
predominantly Tutsi rebel movement that had triggered
* Senior Lecturer in International Human Rights Law, Centre for Applied Human
Rights and York Law School, University of York. This Article is dedicated to Alison Des
Forges who was deeply committed to impartial justice for all of Rwanda’s victims. I want
to thank Thierry Cruvellier, Roger Des Forges, Fidelma Donlon, Aloys Habimana, Scott
Straus, and Carina Tertsakian for numerous discussions on and around this topic. I am
grateful to Leslie Haskell, Jennifer Trahan, Aldo Zammit-Borda, and especially Victor
Peskin for insightful comments on an earlier draft. I also thank Jennifer Trahan and the
Fordham International Law Journal for inviting me to speak at the symposium, at which I
first presented some of the ideas contained in this Article.
1. Claude Jorda, The Major Hurdles and Accomplishments of the ICTY: What the ICC
Can Learn From Them, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 572, 582 (2004).
2. Interview with Judge Erik Møse, then-President of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], in Arusha, Tanz. (Mar. 17, 2003).
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Rwanda’s four-year civil war, killed at least 25,000–30,000 Hutu
civilians.3 Those deaths barely registered amidst the half million
or more Tutsi civilians slaughtered during the genocide that
same year.4 The historian and human rights activist Alison Des
Forges tried to draw attention to those crimes in Leave None to
Tell the Story, her magisterial account of the Rwandan genocide.5
Writing in 1999, she criticized the “mere pretense of justice” for
the victims, and the international community’s indifference.6
Ten years later, the prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) announced that he would not
indict a single RPF soldier for those crimes.7 A year earlier, in
2008, he had agreed to let Rwanda conduct its own domestic trial
of a case previously investigated by his office on the
understanding that he would reassert jurisdiction if the trial was
not fair or effective.8 Rwanda then put four RPF soldiers9 on trial
for the notorious massacre of the Rwandan archbishop, three
bishops, and nine other clergy at Gakurazo in June 1994.10 This
was the first—and only—domestic prosecution of RPF soldiers
for 1994 war crimes. The trial opened with guilty pleas from two
low-ranking soldiers11 and ended with the acquittals of their

3. ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 734
(1999).
4. Id. at 15–16. There is a highly politicized debate over the number killed during
the genocide. See, e.g., Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to
Dictatorship, 103 AFR. AFF. 177, 178 n.1 (2004).
5. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 692–735.
6. Id. at 735.
7. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 2009).
8. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4, 2008).
9. Like many guerrilla movements, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”) had both
a political wing (the RPF) and a military wing (the Rwandan Patriotic Army (“RPA”)),
with the latter controlling the former. When the RPF created a new government after
the genocide, it installed a civilian member of the RPF, Pasteur Bizimungu, as the titular
president, but the real power lay with then-Major General Paul Kagame, who occupied
the vice-presidential and defense minister posts. In 2000, Kagame ousted Bizimungu and
assumed the presidency. He “resigned” from the military to run for president in
national elections in 2003. As there is little distinction between the RPF and RPA (since
renamed) and little (if any) civilian control over the military, I use the terms “RPF” and
“RPF soldiers” throughout this article.
10. See U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4,
2008); Felly Kimenyi, RDF Officers Appear Before Court, NEW TIMES (Kigali), June 17, 2008,
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?article=7195.
11. See Kimenyi, supra note 10.
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commanding officers.12 The prosecutor expressed satisfaction
with the trial and closed his own investigation.13
This episode reflects the current paradigm of international
criminal justice—complementarity—which underpins the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). Under the principle of
complementarity, national jurisdictions get the first crack at
prosecuting genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,
with the ICC only operating as a court of last resort for those
states that prove unwilling or unable to prosecute. This paradigm
accords with the intuition that national courts are often better
positioned to do justice than are international courts.14
Complementarity is thought to have several advantages over the
jurisdictional primacy of the ad hoc international tribunals for
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia: it is more deferential to state
sovereignty, it promotes the diffusion of international norms at
the national level, and it is much less expensive.
To date, the ICC has had no experience monitoring
“complementary” national trials. Consequently, much of the
discussion of complementarity is highly theorized and highly
speculative. This is what makes the agreement between the ICTR
and Rwanda, and the resulting domestic trial, so important: they
may well be harbingers for how “complementarity” plays out at
the ICC.15 First, they suggest that international tribunals will be
unable or reluctant to recognize sham national proceedings
12. See Edwin Musoni, Gumisiriza Acquitted, NEW TIMES (Kigali), Oct. 25, 2008.
13. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4, 2009).
14. See Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy
Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 2 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-60aa962ed8b6/
143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf. National courts are more likely to obtain witnesses
and evidence, be more accessible to victims and affected communities, more efficient,
and less costly than international ones. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive
Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of
International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 68–69 (2008); Paper on Some Policy Issues Before
the Office of the Prosecutor, supra. Other scholars go further, arguing that national justice is
better when it comes to promoting accountability, reconciliation, victim satisfaction,
collective memory, democratic deliberation, and the rule of law. See, e.g., José E. Alvarez,
Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 482 (1999).
15. See Victor Peskin, Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s
Pursuit of Accountability in Uganda and Sudan, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 660 (2009) (noting
that “the actions taken by the chief prosecutors of the ICTY [International Criminal
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia] and ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda] provide important precedents for their counterpart at the ICC [International
Criminal Court]”).
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designed to shield the accused. Second, they make clear that
state cooperation is the Achilles’ heel of international justice.
Finally, they remind us that international justice is inherently
political.
This Article begins by sketching the background of the
recent RPF trial, focusing on domestic impunity for RPF crimes
and strained relations between Rwanda and the ICTR. It next
describes and analyzes the components of the ICTR-Rwanda
agreement: the agreement itself, the RPF trial, and the ICTR
prosecutor’s assessment of the trial. The Article then explores
the larger issues of prosecutorial discretion and independence,
complementarity, and victor’s justice, while examining the
implications for the ICC.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. RPF Crimes and National Impunity: 1994–2007
The RPF’s mostly Tutsi soldiers committed crimes against
humanity and war crimes against mostly Hutu civilians in Rwanda
in 1994.16 A United Nations (“U.N.”) appointed Commission of
Experts found that the RPF soldiers had “perpetrated serious
breaches of international humanitarian law [i.e., war crimes] and
crimes against humanity,” and it “strongly recommend[ed]”

16. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 701–26. This Article focuses on 1994, as the
ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction is limited to that single year. However, RPF soldiers also
killed Hutu civilians during the civil war, which started with its October 1, 1990 invasion
from Uganda and ended in July 1994 with the military defeat of the genocidal regime.
See id. Furthermore, RPF soldiers killed thousands of Hutu civilians after 1994: during
the closing of internally displaced persons camps in 1995, the anti-insurgency campaign
in northwest Rwanda in 1997 and 1998, and the wars in the eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo. See, e.g., GÉRARD PRUNIER, FROM GENOCIDE TO CONTINENTAL WAR:
THE ‘CONGOLESE’ CONFLICT AND THE CRISIS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 16–23, 37–42,
147–48 (2008). There has been virtually no accountability for any of those crimes. See
Fed’n Internationale des Ligues des Droits de L’homme [FIDH] [Int’l Fed’n for Human
Rights], Victims in the Balance: Challenges Ahead for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, at 64, Oct. 25, 2002 (providing statistics of RPA soldiers prosecuted for human
rights crimes between 1996 and 2000). In mid-2009, a United Nations (“U.N.”) “justice
mapping exercise” completed a report on crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed by Rwanda and other actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo. See Jason
Stearns & Federico Borello, Bad Karma: Accountability for Rwandan Crimes in the Congo, in
REMAKING RWANDA: STATE BUILDING & HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Scott
Straus & Lars Waldorf eds., forthcoming 2011).
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prosecution of those crimes.17 Experts working for the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees estimated that the RPF killed an
estimated 25,000 to 45,000 Hutu civilians from April to August
1994.18 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
investigated and publicized the RPF massacres.19 As Des Forges
observed:
These killings were wide-spread, systematic and involved
large numbers of participants and victims. They were too
many and too much alike to have been unconnected crimes
executed by individual soldiers or low-ranking officers. Given
the disciplined nature of the RPF forces and the extent of
communication up and down the hierarchy, commanders of
this army must have known of and at least tolerated these
practices.20

There were credible reports that the RPF’s military commander,
Major General (now President) Paul Kagame, knew about some
of these killings but took no action to stop them.21

17. The Secretary-General, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935, ¶ 95, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Dec. 9, 1994).
18. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 726–31. Despite U.N. efforts to suppress these
findings, the figures were leaked to the press. See id.
19. See id. at 702–26; Amnesty Int’l, Rwanda: Reports of Killings and Abductions by the
Rwandese Patriotic Army, April–August 1994, AI Index AFR 47/016/1994, Oct. 20, 1994.
Filip Reyntjens, a long-time Rwanda expert, has explained why these crimes are not
better known:
Apart from considerations of guilt and political correctness, several factors
explain the conspiracy of silence. On the one hand, most massacres by the RPF
occurred discreetly, and investigations were difficult: areas where they were
committed were declared “military zones” (closed to outsiders), victims’
remains were removed or burned, and regions were closed to access and even
air traffic. On the other hand, observers had an interest in keeping silent:
witnesses of NGOs and international organizations feared expulsion, and
Rwandans ran the risk of reprisals against themselves . . . .
Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda: L’Histoire Secrète (Review), AFR. TODAY, Spring 2008, at 141, 142
(citation omitted); see also DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 731–34. Reyntjens has been
barred from Rwanda ever since he documented some RPF massacres in late 1994.
20. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 734–35.
21. See id. at 735. Seth Sendashonga, a high-ranking RPF official, who went into
exile in 1995 and denounced Kagame over RPF killings, estimated that RPF soldiers
killed approximately 60,000 civilians between April 1994 and August 1995. Human
Rights Watch, Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda, at 89, July 2008
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda0708webwcover.pdf.
Sendashonga was assassinated in Nairobi in 1998. See PRUNIER, supra note 16, at 365–68;
Amnesty Int’l, Rwanda/Kenya: Inquiry into Assassination of Rwandese Opposition Leader in
Exile Urgently Needed, AI Index AFR 47/19/1998, May 18, 1998.
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The RPF-led regime has made very little effort at
accountability for these crimes. As the human rights activist
André Sibomana ruefully observed, “Impunity is always in the
interest of the state, and the current state in Rwanda is no
exception.”22 Over the years, President Kagame has countered
such criticism in three ways. First, he minimizes both the nature
and extent of RPF crimes, acknowledging only “revenge killings”
by a small number of rogue soldiers.23 Second, he claims the
Rwandan government has brought those soldiers to justice.24
Finally, he equates justice for RPF crimes with genocide denial:
While some rogue RPF elements committed crimes against
civilians during the civil war after 1990, and during the antigenocidal campaign, individuals were punished severely . . . .
To try to construct a case of moral equivalency between
genocide crimes and isolated crimes committed by rogue
RPF members is morally bankrupt and an insult to all
Rwandans, especially survivors of the genocide. Objective
history illustrates the degeneracy of this emerging
revisionism.25

President Kagame contends that “‘the country’s military
tribunals have conducted very serious investigations’ into the
crimes and that ‘some of our soldiers were proven guilty,
convicted and executed.’”26 Yet, by the end of 1998, military
courts had prosecuted only thirty-two soldiers for twenty-one
crimes (involving ninety-two civilian victims) committed in
1994.27 All were prosecuted for ordinary murder, not war crimes
22. ANDRE SIBOMANA, HOPE FOR RWANDA: CONVERSATIONS WITH LAURE GUILBERT
AND HERVE DEGUINE 107 (1999).
23. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 732–33. As Des Forges pointed out, “Revenge
killings by soldiers—or other crimes of passion—as well as the unintentional killing of
civilians in combat situations could never account for the thousands of persons killed by
the RPF between April and late July 1994.” Id. at 734.
24. See FIDH, supra note 16, at 16.
25. President Paul Kagame, Preface to AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND BEYOND xxiii
(Phil Clark & Zachary D. Kaufman eds., 2008).
26. FIDH, supra note 16, at 16; see also Martin Ngoga, The Institutionalisation of
Impunity: A Judicial Perspective on the Rwandan Genocide, in AFTER GENOCIDE:
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN
RWANDA AND BEYOND, supra note 25, at 331; Rwanda Denies Rebels Escaped Justice over
Genocide, AFRICA TIMES NEWS, June 3, 2009, http://www.africa-times-news.com/2009/
06/rwanda-denies-rebels-escaped-justice-over-genocide (quoting the Minister of Justice).
27. Law and Reality, supra note 21, at 103. Eleven of these suspects were never
brought to trial and another three trials ended without any judgment. Id.; see also DES
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or crimes against humanity—even in an infamous case involving
the massacre of thirty civilians.28 Only two were higher-ranking
officers: a lieutenant, who was acquitted; and a major, whose
original life sentence was reduced to six years on appeal.29 The
longest sentence imposed was six years and the typical sentence
ranged from two to four years.30 In November 2002, Colonel
Andrew Rwigamba, then the chief military prosecutor, told
Human Rights Watch that there were no open files on 1994
crimes.31 In fact, there were no prosecutions of 1994 RPF crimes
from late 1998 until mid-2008.32
The Rwandan government has also refused to allow civilian
courts to try RPF crimes. Initially, Rwanda’s community courts
(gacaca) had subject matter jurisdiction over war crimes.33 This
was removed in 200434 after some people in pilot gacaca
proceedings had demanded justice for RPF crimes. At one gacaca
session that I attended in 2002, two gacaca judges pleaded for the
court to investigate the arrest and subsequent disappearance of
FORGES, supra note 3, at 733–34 (finding that six of twenty-one RPF soldiers arrested and
charged with killing civilians in November 1994 were convicted and given short
sentences); FIDH, supra note 16, at 64 (providing statistics of RPA soldiers prosecuted
for human rights crimes between 1996 and 2000).
28. Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 104–07.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Interview with Colonel Andrew Rwigamba, then-Military Prosecutor General
(Auditorat Generale), in Kigali, Rwanda (Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with author). The Author
ran Human Rights Watch’s field office in Kigali from early 2002 to early 2004.
32. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Rwanda Tribunal Should Pursue Justice
for RPF Crimes (Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/12/
12/rwanda-tribunal-should-pursue-justice-rpf-crimes.
33. See Organic Law No. 40/2000 art. 1, Official Gazette of the Republic of
Rwanda, Mar. 15, 2001. A copy of the original law is electronically available on the
National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions’ website at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/
pdf/Law.pdf. For critical appraisals of gacaca, see Bert Ingelaere, The Gacaca Courts in
Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT:
LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 25–59 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008). See
also Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 61 (2006); Max Rettig, Gacaca: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
in Rwanda, AFR. STUD. REV., Dec. 2008, at 25. For a much more positive assessment, see
Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Postgenocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765 (2007).
34. See Organic Law No. 16/2004 art. 1, Official Gazette of the Republic of
Rwanda, June 19, 2004, consolidated as amended in Official Gazette of the Republic of
Rwanda, Mar. 1, 2007; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 90. An original
copy of the 2004 law is also electronically available on the National Service of Gacaca
Jurisdictions’ website at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/newlaw1.pdf.
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their family member by RPF soldiers in July 1994.35 The gacaca
president and local officials told them not to confuse that with
genocide and to take their allegations to the local political
authorities or military courts.36 That was not an isolated
incident.37 Rather remarkably, the government agency in charge
of gacaca acknowledged in 2004, “There are even those who feel
marginalized by gacaca because they do not judge the common
crimes [such as murder and theft] committed during the war,
that is between 1990 and 1994, and even those in 1998 in the
north of the country [during the counterinsurgency].”38
Finally, the government has been unwilling to entertain
nonprosecutorial mechanisms for handling RPF crimes, such as a
truth commission or commission of inquiry. Even more
problematically, the government made few efforts to vet human
rights abusers. The most notorious example is Fred Ibingira, who
commanded the troops that massacred an estimated 2,000 to
4,000 Hutu displaced persons at the Kibeho camp in April 1995.39
Ibingira was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for “failing
to give assistance to a person in danger.”40 After being released,
he reassumed his position and President Kagame promoted him
to General in 2004.41
B.

ICTR-Rwanda Relations: 1995–2007

The Rwandan regime has displayed deep mistrust towards
international justice. This is partly due to the low regard in which
it holds the international community, particularly the United
Nations, for failing to prevent or halt the 1994 genocide. More
importantly, however, Rwanda is a de facto one-party state that
does not share the liberal legalism underpinning international

35. This was a gacaca session in Gitarama Province, Rwanda, in July 2002.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Rettig, supra note 33, at 40.
38. Service National des Juridictions Gacaca [National Service of Gacaca
Jurisdictions], Les Problèmes Constates Dans Le Fonctionnement Des Juridictions Gacaca Qui
Ont Terminé Leur 7ème Réunion [The Problems Identified in the Functioning of the Gacaca
Jurisdictions That Have Completed Their Seventh Meeting] (2004) (Rwanda) (translation
provided by Author) (on file with Author).
39. See PRUNIER, supra note 16, at 38–42.
40. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 2 MILITARY LAW REPORTS 306–07 (1999) (Rwanda).
41. Pres. Order No. 35/01, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Oct. 1,
2004, at 17.
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justice.42 “For the RPF, the Arusha tribunal’s judicial process is a
means to seal its military victory over the forces of genocide.”43
The RPF also used the ICTR to discredit and marginalize Hutu
democrats who were not tainted by the genocide.44 Finally, the
regime is committed to ensuring there is no international justice
for its crimes against humanity and war crimes in Rwanda and
the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Rwanda was the only state to vote against the creation of the
ICTR, whose mandate permitted RPF prosecutions.45 Rwanda has
not signed the Rome Statute and it has supported American
efforts to weaken the International Criminal Court.46 Recently,
Rwanda has led opposition to universal jurisdiction at the African
Union (“A.U.”).47 Perhaps, most telling of all, Rwanda blocked
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) from exercising
jurisdiction over the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (“DRC”)
claims that Rwanda had committed genocide in the eastern

42. As Gary Bass observed, “Liberal governments sometimes pursue war crimes
trials; illiberal ones never have.” GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE:
THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIME TRIBUNALS 8 (2000). On Rwanda’s illiberalism, see Human
Rights Watch, Preparing for Elections: Tightening Controls in the Name of Unity, May 2003;
Chi Mgbako et al., Front Line, Rwanda: Disappearances, Arrests, Threats, Intimidation and
Co-option of Human Rights Defenders 2001–2004, at 7–30, 2005, available at
http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/files/en/FrontLineRwandaReport.pdf; Reyntjens,
supra note 4, at 177, 180–87 (2004).
43. KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA’S GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL
JUSTICE 137 (2005); see also Makau Mutua, From Nuremberg to the Rwanda Tribunal: Justice
or Retribution?, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 77, 78 (2000) (contending that “[T]he Rwanda
tribunal largely masks the illegitimacy of the Tutsi regime and allows Tutsis a moral
plane from which to exact their revenge on the Hutus”).
44. See THIERRY CRUVELLIER, COURT OF REMORSE: INSIDE THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 136-153 (Cheri Voss trans., 2010).
45. VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: VIRTUAL
TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 161–63 (2008).
46. In 2003, Rwanda signed a so-called article 98 agreement with the United States,
pledging that it would never hand over U.S. nationals to the ICC. Agreement Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic
of Rwanda Regarding the Surrender of Persons to International Tribunals, U.S.-Rwanda,
Mar. 4, 2003, Temp. State Dep’t No. 03-104, 2003 WL 22309220. Former ICTR
prosecutor Carla Del Ponte speculates that Rwanda signed an article 98 agreement in
return for U.S. support to block ICTR investigations of RPF crimes. CARLA DEL PONTE,
MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE
CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 231 (2008).
47. See, e.g., Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction, ¶ 5, OAU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 199(XI) (July 1, 2008).
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DRC.48 Rwanda successfully argued that its reservation to Article
IX of the Genocide Convention precluded the ICJ from hearing
that case. As Judge Rosalyn Higgins and four other judges wrote
in their concurring opinion, “It must be regarded as a very grave
matter that a state should be in a position to shield from
international judicial scrutiny any claim that might be made
against it concerning genocide. A State so doing shows the world
scant confidence that it would never, ever, commit genocide.”49
It is all the more troubling when that state has built its political
and moral legitimacy on stopping genocide.
Rwanda’s relations with the ICTR have been fraught from
the start. Rwanda objected to the tribunal’s location (in Tanzania
rather than Rwanda), limited temporal jurisdiction (excluding
the lead-up to the genocide from 1990 to 1993), primacy over
Rwandan national courts, exclusion of civil parties, and refusal to
apply the death penalty.50 Since then, Rwanda has regularly
criticized the ICTR’s performance and occasionally suspended
state cooperation.51
The main point of contention between Rwanda and the
ICTR has been over RPF crimes. Although the genocide was
clearly the impetus for the ICTR’s creation, the U.N. Security
Council mandated the tribunal to prosecute not only genocide,
but also “other serious violations of international humanitarian
law.”52 The Security Council’s intention that the ICTR prosecute
RPF crimes is also clear from the tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction,

48. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 6, 33 (Feb. 3).
49. Id. at 71 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada
and Simma).
50. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 156–67. For examples of President Kagame’s
ambivalence and opposition to the ICTR, see JOHN SHATTUCK, FREEDOM ON FIRE:
HUMAN RIGHTS WARS AND AMERICA’S RESPONSE 51–76 (2003), and David P. Rawson,
Prosecuting Genocide: Founding the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
641, 649 (2007).
51. See, e.g., Ngoga, supra note 26, at 328–32. For early confrontations between the
ICTR and Rwanda, particularly over Frouald Karamira and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, see
CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 9–14, 102–14. See also PESKIN, supra note 45, at 170–85.
Peskin convincingly argues that Rwanda’s success in these confrontations “created a
tribunal dynamic of acquiescence vis-à-vis the Rwandan government . . . [which,] in turn,
emboldened the government to strategically withhold cooperation in order to control
the court at key junctures . . . .” PESKIN, supra note 45, at 170.
52. S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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which extends to December 31, 1994. 53 Rwanda wanted the cutoff date to be mid-July 1994, when the genocide ended.54 In
addition, the U.N. decided to situate the ICTR outside Rwanda
“to ensure not only the reality but also the appearance of
complete impartiality and objectivity in the prosecution of
persons responsible for crimes committed by both sides to the
conflict.”55 The Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to
this with resolutions in 2003 and 2004 that explicitly called on
Rwanda “to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary
assistance to the ICTR, including on investigations of the
Rwandan Patriotic Army.”56
Then-ICTR prosecutor Carla Del Ponte met President
Kagame in December 2000 to notify him that she was opening
investigations into RPF crimes.57 At a press conference a few days
later, she precipitously announced she might have an indictment
ready by the end of December 2001.58 She stated she had
requested
President
Kagame’s
cooperation,
while
acknowledging, “Let’s be realistic: without cooperation, I’ll get
nowhere.”59 A year later, cooperation was still not forthcoming.60
The confrontation between Rwanda and the ICTR over RPF
crimes that had been building finally came to a head in 2002. In
January, the main genocide survivors’ organization, Ibuka
(Kinyarwanda for “Remember”), which had been co-opted by the
53. Id.
54. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 162. The ICTR’s limited temporal jurisdiction also
meant that it was not able to prosecute crimes committed after 1994 in Rwanda and
Congo by the RPF and génocidaires. Id.; see Luc Reydams, The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to
the Nuremberg Paradigm?, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 977, 980 (2005). This contrasts sharply
with the ICTY’s open-ended jurisdiction, which enabled that Tribunal to prosecute
crimes committed in Kosovo.
55. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of
the Security Council Resolution 955, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc., S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995)
(emphasis added).
56. S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 3,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
57. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 184. In fact, these investigations had been
initiated by Louise Arbour, Del Ponte’s predecessor, at the end of her term.
CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 160.
58. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 185. She claims she made this public statement to
prevent President Kagame from “backtrack[ing]” on his pledge of cooperation. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 186–87, 191; see MOGHALU, supra note 43, at 139 (speculating that
Kagame may have faced a coup from hardliners in his military if he had cooperated with
Del Ponte).
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RPF in 2000,61 called on genocide survivors to boycott the
tribunal.62 In April, Del Ponte publicly criticized Rwanda for lack
of cooperation with the so-called “special investigations” and
promised to hand down RPF indictments by the end of the year.63
When Ibuka’s boycott failed to slow the trials, the Rwandan
government was forced to show its hand. In June 2002, it
imposed burdensome travel restrictions that prevented
prosecution witnesses from going to Arusha to testify.64 This had
the desired effect: three trials were adjourned for lack of
witnesses.65 Kigali’s action seemed to prove Louise Arbour’s
prediction: “How could we investigate and prosecute the RPF
while we [the prosecutor’s investigators] were based in that
country? It was never going to happen. They would shut us
down.”66 More remarkably, the RPF decided to shut down

61. Antoine Mugesera, a member of the RPF’s central committee, was appointed
president of Ibuka in 2000, the same year that several Tutsi survivors critical of the RPF’s
policies were effectively neutralized. See Human Rights Watch, The Search for Security and
Human Rights Abuses, at 10–11 (Apr. 1, 2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/
reports/2000/rwanda; Int’l Crisis Group, Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary
Political Liberalisation, at 12–13, Africa Report No. 53 (Nov. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/africa/central-africa/rwanda/
rwanda%20at%20the%20end%20of%20the%20transition%20a%20necessary%20political
%20liberalisation.ashx; Reyntjens, supra note 4, at 181.
62. See Genocide Survivors Halt Cooperation with UN Tribunal, U.N. WIRE, January 29,
2002, http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20020129/23361_story.asp; More Witnesses Boycott
UN Tribunal for Rwanda, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY, April 8, 2002,
http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/7834/26; see also Letter from Antoine
Mugesera, President, Ibuka, and Dancilla Mukandoli, President, Avega, to the ICTR
Registrar (Mar. 6, 2002), and appendices (on file with author).
63. Chris McGreal, Genocide Tribunal Ready to Indict First Tutsis: Rwanda is Blocking
Investigations of Former Rebels Despite Pledges, Prosecutor Says, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 5,
2002, at 16.
64. See Erik Møse, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 INT’L J. CRIM. JUST. 920, 939
(2005).
65. See FIDH, supra note 16, at 5. Former ICTR President Erik Møse estimates that
this cost the Tribunal twenty-one trial days. Møse, supra note 63, at 939. Peskin faults the
judges for adjourning trials and thereby passing up “a critical opportunity to expose
Rwandan non-compliance.” PESKIN, supra note 45, at 215. Rwanda also refused to
provide access to documents needed by the prosecution. In June, survivors’
organizations, with government encouragement, staged a demonstration of several
thousand protesters in front of the ICTR’s Kigali offices. Arnaud Grellier et al., KigaliTPIR: Le Bras de Fer [ICTR: The Showdown], June 28, 2002, http://www.rnw.nl/
international-justice/node/31255.
66. CAROL OFF, THE LION, THE FOX AND THE EAGLE: A STORY OF GENERALS AND
JUSTICE IN YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 331 (2000).
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genocide trials to ensure there would be no RPF trials, “effectively
blackmailing” the tribunal.67
The prosecutor informed the Security Council in July that
Rwanda had prevented witnesses from traveling to the tribunal as
a way of pressuring her to halt the special investigations. She
stated, “Currently, there is no genuine political will on the part
of the Rwandan Authorities to provide assistance in an area of
work that they interpret to be political in nature, when,
obviously, the prosecutor limits herself to the technical
implementation of her judicial mandate.”68
In response, the Rwandan government “counter-sham[ed]”
the tribunal for corruption, incompetence, and maltreatment of
witnesses, suggesting that those failings justified Rwanda’s
noncompliance.69 “To thwart Del Ponte, the Rwandan
government . . . cast the ICTR as yet another betrayal by the UN
and the international community.”70 Rwanda also staunchly
opposed prosecutions of RPF crimes:
The Government of Rwanda believes that politically
motivated pursuit of members of the RPA by the ICTR is not
conducive to stability and national reconciliation in Rwanda.
The Prosecutor has confessed to the Government of Rwanda
that she has to pursue indictments against the RPA because
she is under pressure from some states to do so. It would
appear that the proposed indictments of the RPA are merely
intended to appease advocates of a so-called ‘ethnically
balanced justice’ and proponents of revisionism.71

The prosecutor made another appeal for Security Council action
in her annual address in October 2002: “No State can place itself

67. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 224.
68. Id. at 227. Del Ponte’s statement underscores the absurdity of trying to divorce
law and politics when it comes to international justice. See id.
69. PESKIN, supra note 45, at 152.
70. Id. Peskin argues that “Del Ponte’s greatest mistake was in not doing more to
build international support for her investigations or to insulate the prosecutor’s office
from Rwanda’s predictable counter-shaming offensive.” Id. at 224. While Del Ponte
played a difficult hand badly, I am not convinced that she would have had much success
in building international support for RPF investigations. There was simply no political
will to confront Rwanda over the issue.
71. Reply of the Government of Rwanda to the Report of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Security Council, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/2002/842 (July 26,
2002).
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above its international obligations, and co-operation, even on
sensitive issues, must be unconditional.”72
It took nearly a year for the Security Council to finally weigh
in with a tepid reminder that Rwanda had a legal obligation to
cooperate with the tribunal.73 That made it clear that Rwanda
had the upper hand.74 By that point, Del Ponte had already put
the special investigations on hold and Rwanda had allowed the
flow of prosecution witnesses to resume.75 The Security Council’s
failure to respond more forcefully underscored its weak
institutional commitment to international justice. As Ralph
Zacklin, the U.N. Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs,
pointed out: “The reality is that the ICTY and the [ICTR] were
established more as acts of political contrition, because of
egregious failures to swiftly confront the situations in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, than as part of a deliberate policy [of]
promoting international justice.”76 It is no surprise, then, that the
response to Rwanda’s contumacious behavior was political rather
than principled. Of the Security Council’s permanent five, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and China have strong
economic and political investments in Rwanda,77 while China and
Russia are not strong supporters of international justice.
72. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo. [ICTY], Address by
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, Mrs. Carla del Ponte, to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Doc.
JJJ/P.I.S./709-e (Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8056.
73. See S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); DEL PONTE,
supra note 46, at 229; see also Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
art. 28(1), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (“States shall
cooperate with the [ICTR] in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.”).
74. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 216–17.
75. Cruvellier and Peskin state that Del Ponte suspended the special investigations.
CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 161; PESKIN, supra note 45, at 219. In her memoirs, Del
Ponte denies this, stating that the suspension was a rumor spread by the Rwandan
government after she withdrew her investigators from Kigali. DEL PONTE, supra note 46,
at 229. Whether officially suspended or not, the special investigations certainly seemed
to be put on ice.
76. Ralph Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 541, 542 (2004).
77. See generally U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., USAID/RWANDA INTEGRATED
STRATEGIC PLAN 2004–2009: VOL. 1 (2004), available at http://www.usaid.gov/rw/
our_work/for_partners/usaidrwandaintegratedstrategicplan2004-2009.pdf
(outlining
U.S. commitment to Rwanda); Dep’t for Int’l Dev., Rwanda: Country Assistance Plan
2003–2006
(2004)
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/
cap_rwanda.pdf (laying out U.K. commitment to Rwanda); Bosco Hitimana, China,
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On May 15, 2003, then-U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper tried to broker a deal between
Rwanda and the ICTR.78 That agreement would have given
Rwanda the first shot at trying RPF soldiers, while allowing the
ICTR to reassert jurisdiction if the proceedings proved to be
flawed.79 Del Ponte argues she never made a verbal agreement,
while others claim she did but later balked when it came to
signing Prosper’s faxed memorial.80 As Del Ponte recalls:
The key sentence . . . was this: “The [Office of the
Prosecutor] will not seek an indictment or otherwise bring a
case before the [tribunal] unless it is determined that the
[Rwandan government’s] investigation or prosecution was
not genuine.” This sentence is vague, unskillfully vague. Who
is to make this determination? Upon what criteria? What is
the definition of genuine? In my opinion, this sentence
would have presented Rwanda with an opening to kill the
Special Investigation and every other effort the tribunal
might take to exercise its primacy and independence.81

The collapse of the negotiations sparked efforts to remove
Del Ponte as ICTR prosecutor.82 According to Del Ponte, the
United States and the United Kingdom spearheaded her removal
at the behest of Rwanda because of her determination to follow

Rwanda Vow to Boost Trade Relations, EAST AFRICAN BUSINESS WEEK (Kampala), Jan. 19,
2009, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200901191385.html (describing China’s
commitment to Rwanda).
78. See MOGHALU, supra note 43, at 144–48.
79. See id. For Del Ponte’s version of the meeting, see DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at
231. It is somewhat ironic that the U.S. Ambassador was pushing the ICC model of
complementarity given U.S. opposition to the ICC.
80. Compare DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 233, with CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at
162. See also Pierre Prosper, Remarks at the International Symposium on the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Model or Counter Model for International
Criminal Justice? The Perspectives of Stakeholders, Session 2: The Prosecutions 28 (July
9, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/portals/0/english/news/events/
july2009/session2.pdf).
81. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 234. The “genuine” language here mirrors that
found in Article 17 of the ICC Statute. See discussion infra note 234.
82. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 234; see also Marlise Simons, Rwanda is Said to Seek
New Prosecutor for War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at A2.
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through on RPF prosecutions.83 Whether correct or not, it
certainly had that appearance.84
What also hastened Del Ponte’s departure was the Security
Council’s imposition of a “completion strategy” on the ICTR in
August 2003.85 The U.N. and the tribunal’s donors had begun to
fear that the ad hoc tribunals would become ad infinitum unless
they were given a firm deadline to finish their work. As the
former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes recalled: “We
in the United States and other governments, everyone kept
raising that question, ‘This is expensive. This is expensive.’”86
The completion strategy set the deadlines as 2004 for
investigations, 2008 for trials, and 2010 for appeals.87 To meet
those deadlines, the Security Council urged the ICTR “to
transfer cases involving intermediate- and lower-rank accused to
competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including
83. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 234–39; see also MOGHALU, supra note 43, at 134–
36.
84. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 220–22. Cruvellier attributes Del Ponte’s
replacement to her unrealistic plans to prosecute sizable numbers of genocide suspects
at a time when the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States were
eager to impose a completion strategy. Interview with Thierry Cruvellier, Geneva, Switz.
(July 10, 2009); see also MOGHALU, supra note 43, at 133 (observing that Del Ponte was
“initially politically tone-deaf” about the completion strategy).
85. See S.C. Res. 1503, S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). The ICTY had formulated the
basic principles of its completion strategy by mid-2002. See Press Release, ICTY, Address
by His Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council, ICTY Doc.
JDH/P.I.S./690-e (July 26, 2002) (calling for “prosecution and trial of the highestranking political, military, paramilitary, and civilian leaders and [the referral of] certain
cases to national courts.”). For early discussions of the completion strategy, see Laura
Bingham, Strategy or Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 687 (2006) (reviewing early discussions
of the completion strategy), and Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion
Strategies” on the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142 (2005)
(assessing the early wisdom of the completion strategies of the ICTR and ICTY).
86. Pierre Prosper, Remarks at the International Symposium on the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Model or Counter Model for International Criminal
Justice? The Perspectives of Stakeholders, Session 5: Debates with Prosecutors 26 (July
11, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/portals/0/english/news/
events/july2009/session5.pdf) [hereinafter Debates with Prosecutors]. Writing in 2004,
the U.N.’s Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs bluntly stated: “The ad hoc
Tribunals have been too costly, too inefficient and too ineffective . . . . [T]hey exemplify
an approach that is no longer politically or financially viable.” Zacklin, supra note 76, at
545.
87. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 85. The deadline for the completion of trials has
since been extended to the end of 2010. See S.C. Res 1878, ¶¶ 3–6, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1878 (July, 7. 2009).
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Rwanda.”88 The resolution also created a separate ICTR
prosecutor.89 This was not simply an effort to remove Del Ponte:
there were long-standing and justifiable concerns that she and
her predecessors had focused on the Yugoslav cases at the
expense of the Rwanda ones. Finally, the Security Council
reaffirmed Rwanda’s obligation “to intensify cooperation with
and render all necessary assistance to the ICTR, including on
investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army.”90
The completion strategy made clear that international
criminal justice is inherently political. Del Ponte stated that the
strategy “was behind the political pressure that we have acted
on.”91 It also underscored the limits of the ICTR’s independence.
As the ICTR’s former deputy prosecutor caustically remarked:
I don’t think what the Tribunals were asked to do was to
complete their work. They said: ‘Enough is enough. We the
politicians say you have to stop sometime.’ . . . I think we
should get out of the illusion that we’re independent in the
sense of deciding whether justice has been done or not. We
probably are only independent when we are . . . doing the
cases. But in the final analysis, the political authority tells us
when to start, finances us, and tells us when to stop, and if we
don’t stop, they cut off the finances and we have nothing to
do with it.92

Thus, the ICTR prosecutor was caught between the Security
Council’s politics of completion and Rwanda’s politics of
(non)cooperation.
When Gambian Judge Hassan Bubacar Jallow took over as
prosecutor in 2003, he knew Rwanda had successfully halted the
special investigations and had successfully lobbied for his
predecessor’s ouster.93 Where Del Ponte was mercurial and
attention seeking, Jallow has been reserved and diplomatic. As
the tribunal approached its completion date, Jallow kept people
guessing about his intentions.94 When he finally showed his hand

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 85.
Id.
Id.
Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 20.
Bernard Muna, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 27–28.
Reydams, supra note 54, at 978–79.
See id. at 985–86 (arguing that the prosecutor had already demonstrated bias).
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in 2008, it turned out to be the 2003 Pierre-Richard Prosper plan
redux.
II. “AGREEMENT” FOR A DOMESTIC RPF TRIAL
A. Impetus for the Deal
So why did the prosecutor and Rwanda not simply let the
clock run out on the possibility of RPF prosecutions? There was
certainly no pressure from the U.N. or from the United States
and United Kingdom, which are the largest state donors to both
the ICTR and Rwanda. Persistent “naming and shaming” from
human rights NGOs, particularly Human Rights Watch, had
made little headway. What put RPF prosecutions back on the
agenda were Rwanda’s attempts to transfer genocide suspects
from the ICTR and national jurisdictions to stand trial in
Rwanda, along with French and Spanish indictments of the RPF.
1. Transfers of Genocide Suspects
As part of its completion strategy, the ICTR has sought to
transfer cases involving “smaller fish” to national jurisdictions for
investigation and trial. It has had only limited success because
some states lack universal jurisdiction statutes, while others have
not incorporated genocide into their domestic criminal code.95
Still other states are reluctant to go to the expense of prosecuting
suspects with tangential or non-existent links to that jurisdiction.
So far, the only willing Western states have been Belgium,
France, and Canada—states with historical links to Rwanda
and/or sizable Rwandan émigré communities.96
95. The ICTR prosecutor’s attempts to refer the Bagaragaza case to Norway, and
then the Netherlands, foundered because domestic courts in both states lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over genocide. See Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR
2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Revocation of the
Referral to the Kingdom of the Netherlands Pursuant to Rule 11bis (F) & (G) (Aug. 17,
2007); Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR 05-86-AR11bis, Decision on Rule
11bis Appeal (Aug. 30, 2006); see also Alhaqi Marong, The ICTR Transfers Michel
Bagaragaza to the Netherlands for Trial, ASIL INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y. Int’l L, Wash., D.C.),
June 18, 2007, http://www.asil.org/insights070618.cfm.
96. No African states, other than Rwanda, have expressed interest in genocide
referrals from the ICTR. Author’s notes from speech by Hassan B. Jallow,
Commonwealth Secretariat, London, Jun. 25, 2010. See Erik Møse, The ICTR’s Completion
Strategy—Challenges and Possible Solutions, 6 J. INT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 667, 673–74
(2008).
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Not surprisingly, the state with the keenest interest in taking
transfer cases was Rwanda. In an effort to make that happen, the
Rwandan government abolished the death penalty,97 made
judicial reforms,98 created new prison and detention facilities for
transferred suspects,99 and enacted a new law governing
transfers.100 Rwandan officials may also have decided to try an
RPF case to demonstrate their justice system was robust enough
to handle transfers.101
To the Rwandan government’s chagrin, the designated trial
chambers and appeals chamber ended up rejecting all five of the
prosecutor’s motions for referral.102 Although the judges
acknowledged significant improvements in Rwanda’s justice
sector, they held that transferred suspects could not be
guaranteed a fair trial, largely because defense witnesses might
not testify for fear of being arrested under Rwanda’s sweeping
law against “genocide ideology.”103 The judges also found that
97. Organic Law No. 31/2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda (special
ed.), July 25, 2007. A copy of the law is electronically available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/46bada1c2.html.
98. See generally Human Rights Watch, supra note 21.
99. See Willy Mugenzi, Mpanga Prison Ready for ICTR Transfers, Says Mutaboba, NEW
TIMES (Kigali), Mar. 27, 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/200703270457.html.
100. Organic Law No. 11/2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda (special
ed.), Mar. 19, 2007. A copy of the law is electronically available at
http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/
Organic-Law-11-2007-Transfer-ICTR-Other-Cases-to-Rwanda.pdf.
101. Possibly, there was a quid pro quo in which the Rwandan government agreed to
prosecute an RPF case in exchange for the prosecutor’s efforts to transfer genocide
cases to Rwanda.
102. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, ICTR Case No. ICTR 01-67-R11bis, Decision on
the Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda (Dec. 16,
2008); Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR 00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis (Dec. 4, 2008);
Prosecutor v. Gatete, Case No. ICTR 2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request
for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda (Nov. 17, 2008); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case
No. ICTR 2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal against Decision on Referral
Under Rule 11bis (Oct. 30, 2008); Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 97-36-R11bis,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis
(Oct. 8, 2008); see also Phil Clark & Nicola Palmer, The International Community Fails
Rwanda Again 1 (Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series, 2009),
available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/ClarkandPalmer_Rwanda_Final.pdf
(critiquing this group of ICTR decisions).
103. See, e.g., Kanyarukiga, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal Against Decision on
Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶¶ 23–35; see also Law No. 18/2008, Official Gazette of the
Republic of Rwanda, Oct. 15, 2008; Article 19, Comment on the Law Relating to the
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Ideology of Rwanda, Sept. 2009, available at
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transferred suspects were at risk of prolonged solitary
confinement if convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.104
In the wake of those rulings, Rwanda has carved out an
exemption to the “genocide ideology” law for trial testimony,
clarified its sentencing law, and made some improvements to
witness protection for defense witnesses.105 The ICTR prosecutor
has expressed his intention to file new motions for the referral of
eight cases in September 2010.106
Rwanda has also sought the extradition of genocide suspects
from several European jurisdictions.107 The United Kingdom
arrested four genocide suspects in December 2006 pursuant to

http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/
rwanda-comment-on-the-law-relating-to-the-punishment-of-the-crime-of-genocid.pdf;
Lars Waldorf, Revisiting Hotel Rwanda: Genocide Ideology, Reconciliation, and Rescuers, 11 J.
GENOCIDE RES. 101, 101–25 (2009) (describing how Rwanda’s overly broad and vague
law on “genocide ideology” has hampered its efforts to get genocide suspects
transferred and extradited to Rwanda); Amnesty Int’l, Easier to Remain Silent
(forthcoming 2010). A copy of the law cited above is also electronically available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4acc9a4e2.html.
104. See, e.g., Kanyarukiga, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision
on Referral under Rule 11bis, ¶¶ 7, 12.
105. See U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4,
2009) (“[T]he Government of Rwanda . . . has enacted [] additional legislation to meet
the remaining concerns of the Appeals Chamber in relation to the protection of
witnesses and the recording of testimony of witnesses who may be reluctant to travel to
Rwanda to testify. Once the law comes into force and the capacity is established for
witness protection and video link facilities, my Office will again consider making further
applications before the Trial Chambers in the course of this year for the referral of cases
of ICTR indictees to Rwanda for trial.”). The ICTR prosecutor also described changes
made to laws and practices to meet the appeals chamber’s concerns over transfers. See id.
at 31–32; see also Organic Law 3/2009, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda
(special ed.), May 26, 2009, at 3 (amending Organic Law No. 11/2007 concerning the
transfer of cases to Rwanda from the ICTR).
106. Author’s notes from speech by Hassan B. Jallow, Commonwealth Secretariat,
London (June 25, 2010); see also Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR, Statement to
the United Nations Security Council 2 (Dec. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/default.aspx?id=1035; Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at
Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 43–44; Press Release, ICTR, More
Prosecution’s Case Files Transferred to Rwanda, ICTR Doc. ICTR/INFO-9-2-639.EN
(Jun. 8, 2010).
107. See generally REDRESS & African Rights Conference on the Extradition of
Rwandese Genocide Suspects to Rwanda, July 1, 2008, Brussels, Belgium, Extraditing
Genocide Suspects from Europe to Rwanda: Issues and Challenges (Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.redress.org/downloads/country-reports/Extradition_Report_Final_
Version_Sept_08.pdf.
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Rwandan arrest warrants and a special extradition agreement.108
The key issue in the extradition proceedings, as in the ICTR
referral motions, was whether the suspects would be assured a
fair trial in Rwanda. The District Judge sitting in the Westminster
Magistrates’ Court ruled that the suspects could get a fair trial
and ordered their extradition.109 That ruling was overturned on
appeal. The High Court of Justice, following the ICTR decisions,
held the suspects “would suffer a real risk of a flagrant denial of
justice by reason of their likely inability to adduce the evidence of
supporting witnesses.”110 The High Court also went further than
the ICTR decisions: it expressed serious doubts about the
Rwandan judiciary’s impartiality and independence.111 Courts in
France, Germany, and Finland have also refused to extradite
genocide suspects to Rwanda, citing fair trial concerns.112 The
one exception so far has been Sweden, which granted an
extradition request in 2009.113
2. The French and Spanish Indictments
The other source of pressure on Rwanda to try RPF crimes
came from the French and Spanish arrest warrants for highranking RPF officers. In November 2006, Judge Jean-Louis
Bruguière, one of France’s most prominent investigating
magistrates, accused President Kagame and several top-ranking
RPF officers of shooting down former President Juvenal
108. See Mark A. Drumbl, Prosecution of Genocide v. The Fair Trial Principle: Comments
on Brown and Others v. The Government of Rwanda and the UK Secretary of State for
the Home Department, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 289, 289–90 (2010).
109. See Government of the Republic of Rwanda v. Bajinya & Others (Mag., June 6,
2008),
available
at
http://www.trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/
trialwatch/rwandan4decision.pdf.
110. Brown (Bajinya) & Others v. Government of Rwanda & Others, [2009] EWHC
770 (Admin), [66] (appeal from the City of Westminster Magistrates Court).
111. Id. [121].
112. See id. [47]; see also Finland Charges Rwandan Suspect, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8077441.stm.
113. Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2009-05-26 p. 280 (Swed.),
available at http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/domstolar/hogstadomstolen/avgoranden/
OF
JUSTICE,
2009/2009-05-26%20%c3%96%201082-09%20beslut.pdf;
MINISTRY
GOVERNMENT DECISION: EXTRADITION TO RWANDA, Doc. JuBC2008/2175/BIRS (July 9,
2009) (Swed.) (on file with Author). The extradition has been suspended pending a
review by the European Court of Human Rights. Sweden Stops Extradition of Rwanda
Genocide Suspect, AFP, July 16, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5i-2X4PpngZoIZJiLHB2xoh_bDemQ.
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Habyarimana’s plane—the act that triggered the genocide, but
which successive ICTR prosecutors have refused to pursue.114
France had jurisdiction over the case because the pilots killed in
the crash were both French. Bruguière issued arrest warrants for
all the suspects except Kagame, who holds immunity as head of
state.115 He also called on the ICTR to prosecute Kagame.116 The
Rwandan government reacted fiercely; it denounced the
indictments as political, reminded the world of France’s role in
the genocide, expelled the French diplomatic community, and
set up a commission that investigated France’s role during the
genocide. Rwanda also asked the ICJ to find that France had
violated its sovereignty and diplomatic immunities.117 The French
indictment is problematic in that it relies heavily on testimony
from former RPF soldiers, the most prominent of which has since
recanted.118 Interestingly, the Rwandan government decided to

114. Prosecutor Jallow recently explained why the ICTR has not investigated the
plane crash:
All the Prosecutors I believe have taken a similar position with regard to the
shooting down of the aircraft, and this is that it is not a matter which falls
within the mandate of the ICTR. We are mandated to prosecute on the three
specific offences: Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. And
that particular incident does not fall or fit within any of those three offences.
Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 12; DEL PONTE,
supra note 46, at 180 (giving a similar rationale as to why she and Louise Arbour did not
prosecute the plane crash); see also Peter Robinson & Golriz Ghahraman, Can Rwandan
President Kagame be Held Responsible at the ICTR for the Killing of President Habyarimana? 6 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 981, 994 (2008) (arguing against ICTR prosecution despite concluding
it may have been a war crime). But see Leila Sadat, Transjudicial Dialogue and the Rwandan
Genocide: Aspects of Antagonism and Complementarity, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 543, 550 (2009)
(contending that the shooting down of the plane could be a crime against humanity or
complicity in genocide). Sadat also argues that “the ICTR could have served as a more
neutral forum to mediate the dispute” over the downing of the plane. Id. at 550.
However, this ignores the politics of state cooperation: Rwanda simply would not have
permitted the ICTR to try that case.
115. See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 17, 2006, Delivrance de mandats d’arrêt internationaux par le
Juge Jean-Louis Bruguière [Deliverance of International Arrest Warrants by Judge JeanLouis Bruguière], Nov. 17, 2006.
116. See id. at 61–62.
117. Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, The Republic of Rwanda Applies to the
International Court of Justice in a Dispute with France (Apr. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=1909&p1=6&p2=1.
Unsurprisingly,
France did not consent to International Court of Justice jurisdiction in that case.
118. Compare LT. ABDUL JOSHUA RUZIBIZA, RWANDA: L’HISTOIRE SECRÉTE [RWANDA:
THE SECRET HISTORY] 237–41 (Édition du Panama 2005) (accusing the RPF of shooting
down Habyarimana’s plane), with Key Witness in Kabuye Trial Retracts Testimony, RADIO
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challenge the French indictment head on by offering up one of
the accused, Major Rose Kabuye, for trial in France.119
While it was relatively easy to dismiss the French arrest
warrants as politically motivated given the troubled history
between France and Rwanda,120 it was more difficult to ignore the
Spanish warrant. In February 2008, a Spanish investigating judge
issued a lengthy indictment against forty senior RPF military
officers.121 While the indictment names President Kagame, it
rules out arrest while he remains head of state. The investigation
was initially based on the deaths of nine Spaniards but the
indictment goes well beyond that to assert universal jurisdiction
over a range of crimes (including allegations of genocide)
committed against Hutu in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic
of Congo between 1990 and 2002.122
The Rwandan government lambasted the Spanish
indictment:
Judge Fernando Andreu Merelles has never been to either
Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of Congo to conduct
investigations; has never interviewed the alleged suspects in
the alleged crimes; has never liaised with judicial authorities
in either of the two countries. He just sat in Madrid; listened
to well-known detractors of Rwanda and based on their
falsehoods, which he never tried to crosscheck, just went
ahead and issued indictments . . . . Universal jurisdiction is
FRANCE INT’L., Nov. 19, 2008 (recanting earlier accusations), http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/
articles/107/article_2190.asp.
119. Chris McGreal, Top Aide to Rwandan President Agrees to Stand Trial in France over
Genocide Claims: Detained Officer Welcomes Chance to Clear Her Name: Indictment Accused Nine
of Killing Hutu Leader, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 11, 2008, at 16; Rwandan Returns for
French Trial, BBC NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7819679.stm.
It remains to be seen how the trial will progress in light of the recent rapprochement
between France and Rwanda. See Rwanda and France Restore Diplomatic Relations, BBC
NEWS, Nov. 30, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8385887.stm.
120. See DANIELA KROSLAK, THE ROLE OF FRANCE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
(2007); GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 281–99, 337–41
(2d ed. 1999); ANDREW WALLIS, SILENT ACCOMPLICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FRANCE’S
ROLE IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE (2006).
121. SAN, Feb. 6, 2008, Juzgado Central de instrucción no. 4: Auto [Central
Criminal Court No. 4: Preliminary Investigation] [hereinafter Spanish Indictment],
available at http://www.veritasrwandaforum.org/dosier/resol_auto_esp_06022008.pdf.
For a description of the indictment, see Commentary, The Spanish Indictment of HighRanking Rwandan Officials, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1003, 1004–06 (2008), and Human
Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 92–93 (2008).
122. Spanish Indictment, supra note 121, at 2–10, 146–47.

1244 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33:1221
not a license for any judge or other judicial officers to violate
the basic principles of judicial conduct . . . .123

The Rwandan Minister of Justice went further, “The fact that
Spanish courts have universal jurisdiction to try certain offences
committed outside their territory does not give the judge the
right to publish a racist, negationist, and fraudulent document to
violate another country’s sovereignty.”124 He also threatened that
Rwanda would sue the Spanish judge as it had done to the
French judge.125 In addition, Rwanda spearheaded a campaign
against universal jurisdiction at the African Union.126 As a result,
the African Union’s Assembly criticized universal jurisdiction in a
2008 decision: “The political nature and abuse of the principle of
universal jurisdiction by judges from some non-African States
against African leaders, particularly Rwanda, is a clear violation of
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these States . . . .”127
The Assembly also resolved that A.U. member states would not
enforce arrest warrants issued under universal jurisdiction.128
These two indictments may well have increased pressure on
both the ICTR prosecutor and the Rwandan government to be
seen to act on RPF crimes. In particular, the Spanish arrest
warrant named Wilson Gumisiriza, one of the two commanding
officers in the clergy massacre that had been a primary focus of
the ICTR’s special investigations. By finally trying Gumisiriza and
three other officers for that massacre, the Rwandan government
123. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND COOPERATION, COMMUNIQUE: RWANDA
GOVERNMENT REACTION TO THE SPANISH JUDGE INDICTMENTS (2008) (emphasis
omitted), available at http://www.rwandaembassy-japan.org/en/themes/rwanda/
rwanda_images/whatsnew/Communique.pdf.
124. James Munyaneza, Govt Dismisses Spanish Judge’s Indictments, NEW TIMES
(Kigali), Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13435&article=4069
(quoting the Minister of Justice).
125. Felly Kimenyi, Rwanda Ponders Suing Spanish Judge Merelles, NEW TIMES
(Kigali), May 1, 2008, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13517&article=5992
(quoting the Minister of Justice).
126. See Decision on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction, supra note 47, ¶ 1.
127. Id. ¶ 5(ii).
128. Id. ¶ 5(iv). The difficulties faced by universal jurisdiction in Africa are
exemplified by Senegal’s reluctance to try former Chadian dictator, Hissène Habré. See
Reed Brody, The Prosecution of Hissène Habré: International Accountability, National
Impunity, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH
VERSUS JUSTICE 278, 278–300 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006);
Human Rights Watch, The Case Against Hissène Habré, an “African Pinochet,”
http://www.hrw.org/en/habre-case (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
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bolstered its argument that the French and Spanish arrest
warrants were the latest manifestation of Western neocolonialism toward Africa. It also strengthened Rwanda’s case in
the Spanish courts as those courts cannot exercise universal
jurisdiction where the state involved has effectively investigated
and prosecuted the case itself.129
B.

ICTR-Rwanda Agreement

On June 4, 2008, the ICTR prosecutor informed the U.N.
Security Council that Rwanda would prosecute the clergy
massacre that his office had investigated. He assured the Security
Council that the decision was made “on the clear understanding
that any such prosecutions in and by Rwanda should be effective,
expeditious, fair and open to the public.”130 He also pledged that
his office would monitor the Rwandan proceedings and reassert
its primacy if the proceedings proved to be unsatisfactory.131 A
week later, four Rwandan officers were arrested.132 The
prosecutor subsequently provided further details about his
agreement with Rwanda. He claimed he had sufficient evidence
to indict the four suspects and then explained his rationale for
allowing Rwanda to try the suspects:
The Rwandans wanted to be given the opportunity to
prosecute the case, and I did agree with that position.
Essentially, on the basis that if the Rwandan government can
be made to indict and prosecute and effectively and fairly
prosecute people who are seen to be as part of its
establishment, it has the potential to make a bigger
contribution to national reconciliation if the cases can be
dealt with effectively at that level.133
The prosecutor later likened his decision to his earlier transfer of some
30 investigative files on genocide suspects to Rwanda.134
129. See Commentary, supra note 121, at 1008.
130. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4,
2008).
131. Id.
132. See Kennedy Ndahiro, Four RDF Officers Arrested, NEW TIMES (Kigali), June 12,
2008, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13559&article=7042.
133. See Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at
13.
134. See Letter from Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR, to Kenneth Roth,
Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, OTP/2009/P/084 (June 22, 2009)
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From the outset, a domestic trial was a completely
inappropriate substitute for ICTR prosecutions. For the previous
fourteen years, the RPF-led government had shown a marked
unwillingness to prosecute any RPF crimes.135 Furthermore, a
week before the prosecutor’s announcement, an ICTR trial
chamber ruled that Rwanda could not provide fair trials in highprofile genocide cases—cases that are much less politically
sensitive than an RPF trial.136
1. The 1994 Clergy Massacre
Of the thirteen investigative files opened by the special
investigations,137 the clergy massacre was the obvious choice for
Rwanda to prosecute. First, it was the most notorious RPF
massacre as it involved the slaying of an archbishop, three
bishops, and nine clergy.138 Second, its very notoriety and its
small scale (fifteen victims in total) made it look unique, and
thus harder to contend that it constituted a crime against
humanity.139 The massacres in Butare and Giti, which had also
[hereinafter June 22, 2009 Letter from Jallow to Roth], available at http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/related_material/2009_06_Rwanda_Jallow_Response_0.pdf. In June
2010, the Prosecutor referred another twenty-five genocide investigative files to Rwanda.
See Press Release, ICTR, supra note 106. The prosecutor does not require a court order
to refer investigations that have not reached the indictment stage. Cf. ICTR, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, R. 11 bis (Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter ICTR Rules], available at
http://www.unictr.org/portals/0/english\legal\rop\100209.pdf (requiring an order of
the trial chamber for referral of indictments).
135. As Human Rights Watch stated:
We, too, believe that domestic prosecutions are better at fighting impunity
than international trials because they involve the local population in the
judicial process and can have a larger impact on affected communities. Yet the
Government of Rwanda has a strong incentive not to pursue senior RPF
officials who directed crimes in 1994—many of whom may be currently senior
government or military officials. Unfortunately, the choice is not between
international and domestic justice but between international justice and
impunity.
Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Hassan B.
Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR, at 3 (Aug. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Aug. 14, 2009 Letter
from Roth to Jallow], available at http://www.hrw.org/node/85068.
136. See Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR 97-36-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda (May 28, 2008).
137. The special investigations quickly narrowed the focus to three dossiers. DEL
PONTE, supra note 46, at 182, 184.
138. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 714.
139. See ICTR Statute, supra note 73, art. 3 (indicating that crimes against humanity
must involve widespread or systematic attacks against civilians); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v.
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been the focus for the special investigations,140 were more clearly
part of a widespread or systematic attack on Hutu civilians. This is
particularly true of Giti, which is well known for being one of the
few places in Rwanda where genocide did not occur141—though
that was not enough to prevent retaliatory massacres by the RPF.
Third, a trial would give the Rwandan government an
opportunity to put the victims—in this case, the Catholic Church
hierarchy—on trial for its role during the genocide.142 Finally, a
trial would help blunt the Spanish proceedings as one of the
defendants was already subject to a Spanish arrest warrant.143
The basic facts of the massacre have been public for years.
From exile, a Rwandan priest published an account on the
internet in 1999.144 That same year, Des Forges described the
massacre in Leave None:
Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 2165 (Dec. 18, 2008)
(same).
140. See CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 161.
141. See SCOTT A. STRAUS, THE ORDER OF GENOCIDE: RACE, POWER, AND WAR IN
RWANDA 85–87 (2006).
142. The RPF blames the Catholic Church for sowing the seeds of genocide and for
actively participating in the genocide. Tom Ndahiro, a former Commissioner of the
government’s National Human Rights Commission, has espoused this position. See Tom
Ndahiro, The Church’s Blind Eye to Genocide in Rwanda, in GENOCIDE IN RWANDA:
COMPLICITY OF THE CHURCHES? 229 (Carol Rittner et al. eds., 2004). The Rwandan
government put Bishop Augustin Misago on trial in 1999. See Mgbako et al., supra note
42, at 26. Even though he was acquitted, members of the government continue to speak
as if the Bishop was guilty. See id. at 27. In more recent years, the government has
accused various Catholic churches of promoting what it calls genocide ideology. See id.
at 19–22, 25–26. The tension between the Catholic Church and the RPF quickly
resurfaced with this trial:
After the arrest of the suspects, the current Archbishop of Kigali,
Thaddée Ntihinyurwa, told BBC that he feared government interference in
the case.
During his monthly press briefing last week in Kigali, the Rwandan
President Paul Kagame said he was astonished to hear such a statement from
the clergyman, who was himself the object of investigations on his alleged role
in the 1994 genocide.
Rwanda/Justice: Court Remand Soldier-Killers of Rwandan Catholic Clergymen, HIRONDELLE
NEWS AGENCY (Arusha), Jun. 26, 2008 http://www.hirondellenews.com/content/view/
11228/516. For the most balanced accounts of the Catholic Church’s role during the
genocide, see TIM LONGMAN, CHRISTIANITY AND GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2009), and
SIBOMANA, supra note 22, at 121–36.
143. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 94.
144. See Vénuste Linguyeneza, Témoignage Abbé Vénuste Linguyeneza Sur L’assassinat
des Evêques à Gakurazo [Evidence from Vénuste Linguyeneza on the Assassination of Bishops at
Gakurazo], RWANDA TRIBUNE, Dec. 2, 1999, available at http://ndagijimana.rmc.fr/
336538/temoignage-abbe-venuste-linguyeneza-sur-l-assassinat-des-eveques-a-gakurazo.
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The one priest who survived the attack related that the group
of clergy were arrested by the RPF at Kabgayi and moved to
[Gakurazo,] Byimana on June 2. Several days later [on June
5] soldiers who were guarding the clergy burst into the room
where they were gathered and shot them dead. The priest
who managed to flee was later captured by RPF soldiers who
agreed to release him only after he accepted their version of
events, that is, that the soldiers carried out the killings in
reprisal for the slaughter of their own families.145

The revenge killings explanation struck some scholars and
clergy as implausible because the massacred clergy had saved
many Tutsi at Kabgayi.146 Although Archbishop Vincent
Nsengiyumva was a close associate of President Habyarimana,
Bishop Thaddée Nsengiyumva was a well-known progressive who
had tried to distance the church from the President.147 Prunier
suggests that the clergy were deliberately killed to prevent them
from playing a role in mediating an end to the war and
genocide—something that would have deprived the RPF of total
victory.148 In her memoirs, Del Ponte also recalled doubting the
official line, “I was skeptical. These victims, including the highestranking churchmen in Rwanda, were held for four days, long
enough for high-ranking commanders of a well-disciplined
militia to know of their capture and whereabouts, long enough
for the killings to have been pre-meditated or ordered from
above.”149 As discussed below, Rwanda’s trial of the massacre
merely served to reinforce the official narrative.
Even though the clergy massacre was “[t]he most widely
known and condemned of executions by RPF soldiers,”150 the
RPF did not prosecute the perpetrators until fourteen years later.
In 1999, Des Forges wrote:
When the RPF officially admitted responsibility for the
slayings several days later, it declared that one of the
murderers had been killed in flight and that the others were
145. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 714. For another (second-hand) account of the
massacre, see RUZIBIZA, supra note 118, at 303–09.
146. See PRUNIER, supra note 120, at 271.
147. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 43–44, 714; PRUNIER, supra note 120, at 270–
72; SIBOMANA, supra note 22, at 74–75.
148. PRUNIER, supra note 120, at 271–72. Sibomana found this explanation “more
convincing.” SIBOMANA, supra note 22, at 74–75.
149. DEL PONTE, supra note 46, at 178.
150. DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 714.
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being sought and would be tried. Apparently none was ever
caught and RPF authorities have never made public any
proof to substantiate their claim that the slayings were
unauthorized reprisal killings.151

During the 2008 trial, it became clear that those responsible for
the massacre and their commanding officers had been clearly
identified by 1998,152 but that did not prevent them from
continuing their military service—and even getting promoted.153
2. 2008 Trial and 2009 Appeal
The Rwandan military prosecutor drafted the indictment
based on evidence gathered by his office. That indictment was
approved by the ICTR prosecutor’s office, which contends that it
did not share any of its evidence with Rwanda.154 The military
court proceedings, which ran intermittently from June 17 to
October 27, 2008, opened with guilty pleas from the two lowerranking officers, Captain John Butera and retired Captain
Dieudonne Rukeba, and ended with the acquittals of the two
higher-ranking officers, General Wilson Gumisiriza and Major
Wilson Ukwishaka.155
At trial, Captains Butera and Rukeba testified that they had
agreed to help a fellow soldier, Sergeant Déo Nyagatare, avenge
151. Id. Prunier offered a more scathing assessment:
The killers were said to have been one, two or three according to different
versions of the event. One was shot on the spot by the Bishops’ bodyguards
(although they “had not been able to prevent the massacre”—they cannot
have been very efficient bodyguards since machine-gunning fifteen people
takes some time) and the others, if they ever existed, vanished into thin air, in
spite of the [Rwandan Patriotic] Front saying they were “actively sought after
and would be tried.”
PRUNIER, supra note 120, at 271 n. 117.
152. The military interviewed several participants and witnesses in 1997 and 1998.
Trial Observation Notes by Anonymous, in Kigali, Rwanda (Aug. 19, 2008) (on file with
author). This Author promised anonymity to the trial observers.
153. Both sergeants who took part in the killings were later promoted to captain.
The commanding officers, a major and a captain, were later promoted to brigadier
general and major, respectively. Trial Observation Notes by Anonymous, in Kigali,
Rwanda (Aug. 20, 2008) (on file with author).
154. See June 22, 2009 Letter from Jallow to Roth, supra note 134; Hassan B. Jallow,
Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 13.
155. Le Tribunal Militaire (Kigali) [Military Tribunal], No. RP 0151/08/TM, Oct.
24, 2008 (Gumisiriza, Trial Judgment), ¶¶ 13, 196–97 (Rwanda) (on file with Author).
These were the defendants’ ranks at the time of trial. For their ranks at the time of the
massacre, see supra note 153.
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his Tutsi family members, who were allegedly killed while under
the care of the bishops at Kabgayi.156 Captain Butera explained
his participation with reference to the Church’s alleged
complicity in the genocide, “Everywhere we went, we never failed
to find corpses in the churches. We also found people who were
in agony in those churches, but we also found clergy who were in
their parishes without doing anything to save these people in
danger.”157 He claimed to have acted without thinking, “I fired
like a crazy person. When our friend asked us for help, I had a
shock in my head. And when I remembered all that I had seen in
those churches, I lost all control and I fired . . . .”158 According to
Butera and Rukeba’s defense, they acted without premeditation
in response to provocation (i.e., the clergy’s role in the
genocide).159
The key issue at trial was whether General Gumisiriza and
Major Ukwishaka should bear command responsibility for their
subordinates’ acts.160 The prosecutor insisted they knew, or
should have known, that the clergy were in danger, but failed to
take reasonable steps to protect them.161 The prosecutor pointed
to evidence that, when the clergy were being transported to
Gakurazo, a crowd of displaced genocide survivors booed them,
shouting “See the Interahamwe [the genocidal militia]!”162 Major
Ukwishaka admitted hearing this, but said he did not take it
seriously because he had no reason to think his own troops would

156. Trial Observation Notes (Aug. 19, 2008), supra note 152, at 9–10, 12. They
were joined by a fourth soldier, Eugène Kabandana, who was apparently shot while
fleeing the massacre. Gumisiriza, Trial Judgment, ¶ 22. Deo Nyagatare, who allegedly
instigated the massacre, appears to have died some time later.
157. Trial Observation Notes (Aug. 19, 2008), supra note 152, at 12.
158. Id. at 10.
159. Id. at 9–11.
160. The trial was marked by debates over the applicability of international
humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions and the two Additional
Protocols. Trial Observation Notes (Aug. 20, 2008), supra note 153, at 23–28. This was
noteworthy because earlier prosecutions of RPF killings had studiously avoided the law
and language of war crimes.
161. Id. at 14–16. The ICTR Appeals Chamber has stated that “[t]he ‘reason to
know’ standard is met when the accused had ‘some general information in his
possession, which would put him on notice of possible unlawful acts by his
subordinates.’” Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52A, Judgment, ¶ 791 (Nov. 28, 2007). On command responsibility generally, see
ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 257–71 (2008).
162. Trial Observation Notes (Aug. 20, 2008), supra note 153, at 16.
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commit vengeance.163 General Gumisiriza testified he could not
have foreseen such a risk to the clergy: “I could not avoid this
incident because I could not know what someone who wants to
kill thinks especially when he said nothing to me about what he
thought of doing. I could not even premeditate that this incident
was going to happen given that, above all, we had never known
such an incident since the war broke out [in October 1990].”164
He also stated that he was some ten to fourteen kilometers away
when the massacre occurred, that he immediately ordered an
investigation, and that he had Major Ukwishaka (temporarily)
arrested as part of that investigation.165 Responding to a question
from the presiding judge, he claimed that “Our soldiers had
been well trained well in advance on humanitarian law. I also had
confidence in them, especially seeing as we had never known a
violation of humanitarian law anywhere we had been.”166
Gumisiriza’s defense lawyer also stressed the General had not,
and could not have, known the clergy were at risk because
“killing civilians was not a generalized practice within the
[RPF].”167
The military prosecutor presented four prosecution
witnesses: a soldier and a young woman who were inside the hall
when the massacre occurred, and a soldier and clergyman who
were outside the hall. The clergyman testified that the murdered
clergy came to Gakurazo voluntarily because it had water,
hygiene and more security than Ruhango.168 He also praised
Gumisiriza and Ukwishaka for their compassionate investigation
of the massacre.169 The young woman who took the stand was
serving a seventeen-year sentence for involvement in the
genocide.170 She testified that she did not see the killers and that
the RPF soldiers had given them a sense of security.171 The two
soldiers who testified had been serving under Ukwishaka’s
command at the time. Their testimony added very little: they
163. Id. at 15.
164. Id. at 18.
165. Id. at 18, 19, 29.
166. Id. at 20.
167. Id. at 29.
168. Trial Observation Notes by Anonymous, in Kigali, Rwanda 41–42 (Sep. 2,
2008) (on file with author).
169. Id. at 41.
170. Id. at 44.
171. Id.
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were unable to identify the killers and did not provide any
information related to the issue of Ukwishaka’s command
responsibility.172
The two captains who pled guilty presented eight witnesses
to support their defense of provocation. Those witnesses testified
about the Catholic Church’s complicity in the genocide and
about the role allegedly played by some of the murdered
clergy.173 The defense offered no evidence, however, that
Sergeant Déo Nyagatare’s family had actually been killed at
Kabgayi while under the protection of these clergy. The two
commanding officers, Gumisiriza and Ukwishaka, testified in
their own defense, but did not call any witnesses to corroborate
their claims.
Overall, the prosecution case was quite weak. First, the
prosecution witnesses might just as well have testified for the
defense. Indeed, General Ukwishaka invoked the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses in his defense.174 Second, the
prosecutor rarely challenged the defendants’ version of events.
Third, the prosecutor introduced evidence that the massacre had
not been planned in advance. Rather than questioning why the
RPF had moved the clergy to the remote hamlet of Gakurazo
away from international scrutiny, the prosecutor repeatedly
stressed that the clergy themselves had requested the move to
Gakurazo for their safety and well-being.175 Finally, the
prosecutor failed to make a convincing case for command
responsibility. He could have done so by presenting evidence that
RPF commanders were on notice that their soldiers were killing
civilians. In fact, he could have argued that this was not the first
time that RPF soldiers had deliberately targeted members of the
Catholic clergy; in April 1994, they killed a Spanish priest
(Joaquín Valmajo) and three Rwandan priests (Joseph Hitimana,
Faustin Mulindwa, and Fidéle Mulinda).176 Not surprisingly, the
military prosecutor chose not to go down that particular route.
Consequently, the military court acquitted the two
commanding officers. It found they had no reason to suspect
172. Id. at 46.
173. Le Tribunal Militaire (Kigali) [Military Tribunal], No. RP 0151/08/TM, Oct.
24, 2008 (Gumisiriza, Trial Judgment), ¶¶ 89–117 (Rwanda) (on file with Author).
174. See id. ¶ 128.
175. See id. ¶¶ 18–19.
176. See DES FORGES, supra note 3, at 711.
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their subordinates might kill the clergy.177 The court rejected the
military prosecutor’s claim that the officers should have taken
precautions because of the Tutsi refugees’ insults against the
clergy.178 The court repeatedly stressed that this massacre was
unique:
The military prosecutor states moreover that the must
have known standard is based on the nature of the crime
having “widespread occurrence and notoriety” . . . .
. . . Both parties in this trial agree on the fact that there
were not other massacres [of this nature] any place where
these soldiers had been.
On this point, this case is distinguished from those of
Yamashita and Celebici because, in those two cases, the
crimes were committed over time and space (were
widespread and notorious) so the commander must have
known they had been committed (presumption of
knowledge).. . . .
. . . [T]hese massacres were committed by surprise and
it was the first time that such acts occurred . . . .179

Thus, this acquittal, like the military prosecutor’s case, rests on
the falsehood that RPF soldiers had not already committed
similar massacres throughout Rwanda in 1994. In addition, the
court focused on the knowledge element and failure to prevent,
but said nothing about the failure to punish. The judgment (and
lawyers) cited several scholarly articles on command
responsibility and ICTY judgments,180 but there was no reference
to ICTR case law.
As for the two subordinates, the court rejected their defense
of provocation on the grounds that they had no links to the
murdered clergy (specifically, none of their family members had
been injured by those clergy).181 The court found them guilty of
murder in violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions and the Rwandan Penal Code,182 but the court
found several mitigating factors—their guilty pleas, the lack of
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Gumisiriza, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 150–64.
Id. ¶¶ 154, 158, 163.
Id. ¶¶ 154–56, 159 (translation provided by Author).
Id. ¶¶ 30, 56–59, 75, 131–32, 136-138, 151, 156–57, 174, 180.
Id. ¶ 165–66.
Id. ¶ 167.
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premeditation, the absence of prior criminal records, and other
circumstances, such as the corpses they had seen in churches—
and sentenced them to eight years each.183
In late February 2009, a military appeals court upheld the
acquittals and reduced the sentences against both confessed
soldiers from eight to five years.184 With respect to command
responsibility, the appeals court ruled that “A person can only be
punished/sentenced only if there is clear and undoubtedly
evidence of notoriety and widespread nature of any kind of crime
to be committed; in this case there was no way how the two
commanders would have known that their subordinates were
going to commit a crime.”185
3. ICTR Prosecutor’s Review
Prosecutor Jallow had promised the Security Council his
office would monitor the proceedings so he could reassert
jurisdiction if they were not “effective” or “fair.”186 Yet, as Human
Rights Watch reported, the prosecutor “sent an observer for only
two preliminary detention hearings, one trial day, closing
arguments and the verdict. That cursory presence did not
constitute diligent monitoring.”187
Although the appeals judgment was handed down in
February 2009, Jallow maintained a studied silence about the trial
until questioned by members of the Security Council on June 4,
2009.188 At that point, he finally stated:

183. Id. ¶ 168–69.
184. De la Haute Cour Militaire [High Military Court], No. RPA 0062/08/HCM,
Feb. 25, 2009 (Gumisiriza, Appeal Judgment), ¶¶ 89–117 (Rwanda) (on file with
Author); see also Edwin Musoni, Gumisiriza Wins Appeal, NEW TIMES (Kigali) Feb. 26,
2009, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13818&article=13710.
185. Gumisiriza et al., Appeal Judgment, ¶ 42.
186. U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4,
2008).
187. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch to
Hassan B. Jallow, Chief Prosecutor, ICTR (May 26, 2009) [hereinafter May 26, 2009
Letter from Roth to Jallow], available at http://www.hrw.org/node/83536. The
prosecutor disputed this contention. See June 22, 2009 Letter from Jallow to Roth, supra
note 134; Aug. 14, 2009 Letter from Roth to Jallow, supra note 135.
188. See U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 11–13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June
4, 2009). The prosecutor made no mention of the RPF trial during his oral statement.
Id. The questions were raised by representatives of the United States and Costa Rica. Id.
at 27–28.
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Regarding the matter of allegations against the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), we of course recognize that
this is a matter that falls within our mandate, and we have
been investigating those allegations with the result that, last
year, we were able to reach an understanding with the
Rwandans, who wanted to prosecute the case that we had
developed . . . .
. . . [W]e gave the Rwandan prosecuting authorities the
opportunity to proceed with that case against four senior
military officers for the killings of those clergy and other
civilians . . . . The report of my monitors indicates that the
standards of fair trial were observed . . . .189

Revealingly, Jallow still referred to RPF crimes as
“allegations” even after the two captains had confessed and been
convicted of participating in the clergy massacre. The prosecutor
later elaborated that “the trial had been open, public, free and
fair.”190 He contended that the evidence introduced at trial was
“consistent with what we have and with the position that we had
taken.”191 He noted that the RPF officers were charged with
violations of the Geneva Conventions.192 He then continued, “We
should not simply say because people have been acquitted, the
trial wasn’t fair. I mean, a fair trial clearly has the potential for
acquittals and for convictions. So it’s not really the outcome
which is the critical factor. It’s the process . . . .”193
Initially, Jallow told the Security Council that the Rwandan
proceedings would have to be “effective, expeditious, fair and
open,”194 but in his June 2009 response to the Security Council,
he stated only that the trial had been fair without ever
mentioning whether it had been effective.195 The real issue is not
about the trial’s process or fairness, but rather about its
genuineness. A trial can be procedurally fair in that it observes
international human rights norms, but still be inadequate. This is
reflected in the ICTR statute, which permits the ICTR to try a
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
2008).
195.
2009).

Id. at 33.
Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 5904th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5904 (June 4,
U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4,
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suspect already tried domestically for genocide, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes if “[t]he national court proceedings
were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case
was not diligently prosecuted.”196
In fact, there are serious doubts about both the fairness and
genuineness of this trial. First, Rwanda’s military courts are not
independent and impartial, and there is little transparency about
their functioning and performance. Even the civil courts, where
donors focused their rule of law efforts, remain subject to
executive influence, particularly in politically sensitive cases.197
Consequently, the U.K. High Court of Justice expressed serious
doubts about the Rwandan judiciary’s independence and
impartiality.198 Second, Rwanda did not “diligently prosecute”
the clergy massacre. The military prosecutor called only four
prosecution witnesses, each of whom gave testimony favorable to
the defendants and their version of events. This was hardly
surprising; after all, the ICTR chambers and U.K. High Court
196. ICTR Statute, supra note 73, art. 9(2)(b).
197. The U.S. State Department raised concerns about judicial independence in its
human rights report for 2008:
[T]he judiciary operated in most cases without government interference;
however, there were constraints on judicial independence. Government
officials sometimes attempted to influence individual cases, primarily in gacaca
cases. There were reports that some members of the executive branch
considered it appropriate to call judges to discuss ongoing cases privately and
to express executive preferences.
During the year the country passed a constitutional amendment that
reduces most judicial appointments from life to four or five years, potentially
limiting judicial independence.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2008 (2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119019.htm. In its report for
2009, the State Department raised similar concerns while recognizing that “[u]nlike in
previous years, there were no reports that members of the executive branch called
judges to discuss ongoing cases privately and to express executive preferences.” U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2009 (2010), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135971.htm. See also Human Rights
Watch, supra note 21, at 44–69; Lars Waldorf, A Justice ‘Trickle-Down’: Rwanda’s First
Postgenocide President on Trial, in PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE 151, 151–75 (Ellen L.
Lutz & Caitlin Reiger eds., 2009) (describing the unfair trial of former President Pasteur
Bizimungu and his co-accused). But see Sam Rugege, Judicial Independence in Rwanda, 19
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 411, 423 (2006) (claiming that “Rwanda has a
government that respects the principle of the rule of law and that does not interfere in
the judicial tasks of the courts”).
198. Brown (Bajinya) & Others v. Government of Rwanda & Others, [2009] EWHC
770 (Admin), [119], [121].
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found a real likelihood that witnesses in Rwanda would be too
fearful to give exculpatory testimony for genocide suspects—
something that is much less politically sensitive than accusing
RPF soldiers of war crimes. Finally, the two sentences handed
down in this case do not reflect the gravity of the crimes
committed, though they are consistent with the light sentences
given to RPF soldiers convicted of murder.199
Human Rights Watch, which monitored the trial, released a
damning assessment:
The trial proved to be a political whitewash and a
miscarriage of justice . . . . Both the prosecution and the
defense presented the killings as spontaneous reactions by
soldiers overcome with grief for their fellow RPF officers who
had lost relatives in the genocide. The court heard testimony
only from witnesses supporting this version of events . . . .200

Human Rights Watch also directly challenged the
prosecutor’s endorsement of the evidence presented at that trial:
We question your statement that your office does not
possess evidence showing that the Kabgayi killings were a
planned military operation. . . .
....
. . . [W]e gave you specific names of senior RPF officers
whom we believed were involved in both the ordering and
the execution of the killings. Through this evidence, we laid
out a compelling argument that calls into question the
Rwandan prosecution’s theory that the killings were
spontaneous acts by low-level soldiers and shows instead that
this was an attempt to cover up responsibility for a planned
military operation.201

When prosecutor Jallow was publicly confronted by Human
Rights Watch at a July 2009 conference, he responded: “All you
have given us is your . . . own interpretation of the evidence, and
it differs from [our] interpretation, and we are not bound by

199. Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, 104–09.
200. May 26, 2009 Letter from Roth to Jallow, supra note 184.
201. Aug. 14, 2009 Letter from Roth to Jallow, supra note 135, at 2–3. For a fuller
description of the evidence that was not presented at trial, see Leslie Haskell & Lars
Waldorf, The ICTR’s Impunity Gap: Causes and Consequences (forthcoming) (manuscript at
13–14, on file with author).
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your own interpretation.”202 Former prosecutor Del Ponte also
disputed Jallow’s positive assessment of the trial:
[T]hey have been acquitted—that is the confirmation that
shows that Rwanda did not want to do these cases. For me,
it’s the proof . . . that they are not able and they are not
willing. I heard that myself directly from President Kagame.
He told me at that time that they would not do them. This
confirms that.203

III. LARGER ISSUES
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecutorial Independence
The prosecutor exercised his prosecutorial discretion over
the clergy massacre at three critical junctures. First, he decided
not to indict the four RPF officers. Had he indicted them, then
his referral of the case would have required judicial approval.204
However, a trial chamber had already rejected one of the
prosecutor’s motions to refer the less sensitive genocide cases.205
Second, he allowed Rwanda to try the case despite the ICTR’s
primacy.206 Finally, he determined the Rwandan trial was fair and
thus did not need to take back the case.207
The prosecutor has wide discretion whether or not to
prosecute. While indictments must be reviewed by a trial
chamber,208 there is no direct mechanism for reviewing a
decision not to indict.209 The only avenue to challenge this is
indirectly through a defense of selective prosecution. Several
ICTR defendants have tried this, arguing that the prosecutor has
only prosecuted one side of the Rwandan conflict and that
virtually all the defendants are Hutu. This argument, which
202. Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 46.
203. Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 22–23
(translation provided by author).
204. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text.
208. See ICTR Statute, supra note 73, art. 18(1). The prosecutor does not require
judicial authorization in order to open an investigation, as happens at the ICC. Jallow,
supra note 94, at 147. Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 73, art. 17, with Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 53, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
209. See Reydams, supra note 54, at 983.
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smacks of a tu quoque defense, has been uniformly rejected.210
Early on, the ICTR appeals chamber made clear that the
defendant has to do more than allege discriminatory effect; he
also must prove an unlawful or improper (i.e., discriminatory)
intent with respect to his own prosecution.211 It is particularly
difficult for a defendant to make that showing where there
already exists a prima facie case against him.212
In response to the completion strategy imposed by the
Security Council, the ICTR prosecutor published his criteria for
exercising prosecutorial discretion in 2004:
In determining which individuals should be subject to trial
before the [ICTR], the Prosecutor will be guided by the need
to focus on those who are alleged to have been in positions
of leadership and those who, according to the Prosecutor,
bear the greatest responsibility for genocide. This
concentration on the most senior leaders suspected of being
most responsible for the crimes committed within the
jurisdiction of the [ICTR] is in conformity with Security
Council resolution 1534 (2004). The criteria taken into
consideration when making this determination are as
follows:


the alleged status and extent of participation of
the individual during the genocide



the alleged connection an individual may have
with other cases



the need to cover the major geographical areas of
Rwanda in which crimes were allegedly committed



the availability of evidence with regard to the
individual concerned



the concrete possibility of arresting the individual
concerned

210. See Jallow, supra note 94, at 155.
211. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 94–96 (June 1,
2001); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR 96-10-I & ICTR 96-17-T, Judgment
and Sentence, ¶¶ 870–71 (Feb. 21, 2003); see also Jallow, supra note 94, 155–59
(summarizing this case law).
212. See Jallow, supra note 94, at 160.
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the availability of investigative material for
transmission to a State for national prosecution.213

What is most striking about these criteria is that they only refer to
genocide cases. This is consistent with the Prosecutor’s decision
to ignore Security Council resolution 1503’s call for Rwandan
cooperation on RPF crimes.214
The prosecutor’s criteria have altered over the years.215 The
most significant change came in 2005 when the prosecutor
added national reconciliation: “National reconciliation is
anticipated to be an important outcome of the prosecution
process. Hence, the extent to which the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion impacts on this objective—positively or adversely—is a
relevant consideration.”216 The prosecutor’s reference to national
reconciliation is rooted in Security Council Resolution 955,
which created the ICTR. That Resolution optimistically
proclaimed “the prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law . . . would contribute
to the process of national reconciliation.”217 However, there is no
reference to “national reconciliation” anywhere in the ICTR
Statute itself.

213. President, ICTR, Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Letter Dated 30 April 2004 from the President of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States between 1 Jan. and 31 Dec. 1994 addressed to the President of the
Security Council, Annex, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/2004/341 (May 3, 2004). In a 2005 article,
the former Chief of Prosecutions at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, who had
previously served in the ICTR Prosecutor’s office, criticized the ICTR and ICTY
Prosecutors for exercising their discretion without sufficient transparency. Luc Côté,
Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 162, 171–72 (2005).
214. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. On one occasion, he incorrectly
stated that the Security Council had required him to focus on genocide cases: “The
strategy of prosecution as dictated by the Security Council is to concentrate on those
bearing the greatest responsibility for the genocide, the leaders of the genocide.”
Hassan B. Jallow, Prosecutor, ICTR, The OTP-ICTR: Ongoing Challenges of Completion
6 (Nov. 1, 2004) (emphasis added); see also Reydams, supra note 54, at 986.
215. See Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 5–
6 (listing four criteria: “the status of the offender” during the genocide; “the nature and
extent of the [individual’s] participation”; “the nature of the offence”; and the “issue of
national reconciliation”).
216. Jallow, supra note 94, at 154.
217. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 52, pmbl.
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As a criterion for prosecutorial discretion, national
reconciliation is very problematic because it means the
prosecutor is engaged in highly speculative and political
predictions about what will heal Rwandan society—something
well beyond his competence. Because “national reconciliation” is
neither defined nor measured, it can be used to justify any act of
prosecutorial discretion, such as the prosecutor’s decision to
allow Rwanda to try the clergy massacre itself. Furthermore, it is
just as likely (if not more so) that this decision to prosecute only
one side of the Rwandan conflict will make reconciliation more
difficult. As Adama Dieng, the Registrar of the ICTR and former
secretary-general of the International Commission of Jurists, has
written:
While the Preambles of the Tribunals and the International
Criminal Court refer to peace and the deterrence of further
crimes, their most important mandate is the provision of
equitable and impartial justice. Deterrence, reconciliation,
and the maintenance of peace will be logical consequences
of equitable and impartial justice.218

The prosecutor also has wide discretion when it comes to
letting states try suspects and then assessing those domestic trials.
While the ICTR has “concurrent jurisdiction” with national
courts, it can exercise its primacy at any stage by requesting
national courts to “defer” their proceedings.219 Only the
prosecutor can initiate a request for deferral.220 He “may” do so if
the matter is already under his investigation.221 The Prosecutor’s
decision not to request a deferral of Rwanda’s clergy massacre
trial is not judicially reviewable.
Prosecutorial discretion is intimately linked to prosecutorial
independence. The ICTR Statute provides for such
independence: the Prosecutor “shall not seek or receive

218. Adama Dieng, International Criminal Justice: From Paper to Practice—A
Contribution from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 688, 700 (2002).
219. ICTR Statute, supra note 73, at art. 8; ICTR Rules, supra note 134, R. 9–11; see
also Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 362–63 (1997).
220. ICTR Rules, supra note 134, R. 9.
221. Id.
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instruction from any government or from any other source.”222
The Prosecutor claims his prosecutorial discretion with respect to
the RPF cases was based on only two factors (prosecutorial
independence and the sufficiency of the evidence)—marking yet
another shift in the criteria.
But like all the cases we do [i.e., the genocide cases],
whatever we decide has to be based on the evidence that is
available. . . . That is the basis on which we have to proceed
and no other considerations. And we have to proceed also
having due regard and respect for the independence of the
Office of the Prosecutor. . . . We can’t accept any attempts to
improperly influence the position of the Office of the
Prosecutor in this respect.223

Such claims of prosecutorial independence ring hollow given the
pressure that Rwanda put on successive prosecutors not to issue
indictments for RPF crimes. In that context, the decision not to
indict any RPF crimes “challenges the image of independence of
the prosecutor.”224
The RPF trial underscores the main weakness of
international criminal justice—its reliance on state cooperation.
Having been created under the U.N. Security Council’s chapter
VII powers,225 the ICTR is much stronger than the treaty-based
ICC. First, it has primacy over national jurisdictions.226 Second,
the ICTR can call on the Security Council to enforce state
cooperation, whereas the ICC has to rely on states complying
with their treaty obligations (except when, as with Darfur, the
Security Council refers the situation). In fact, however, the ICTR
was never able to gain Rwanda’s cooperation over its RPF
investigations—even when it appealed to the Security Council.227
222. ICTR Statute, supra note 73, at art. 15(2). In truth, the prosecutor’s
independence is circumscribed by the Security Council and the trial chambers. See id. at
arts. 10, 12, 32.
223. Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 12.
224. Côté, supra note 213, at 177. Côté had good reason to be critical: as Chief
of Prosecutions at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, he prosecuted all sides of
the conflict, including powerful members of the post-conflict government. Id. at
162.
225. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 52.
226. See Morris, supra note 219, at 364–65.
227. The Security Council has proved ineffectual when it comes to international
criminal justice, first with the ICTR’s RPF investigations and, more recently, with the
ICC’s Darfur indictments. See, e.g., Alex de Waal, Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The
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The need for international tribunals to secure state cooperation
means that international justice is inherently political.228 As
former ICTR and ICTY prosecutor Del Ponte stated, “The legal
obligation [for state cooperation] already exists, but in reality, it
has not been applied. Thus, we always need politics.”229
B.

Complementarity

Lacking Rwanda’s cooperation, the ICTR prosecutor
decided to throw away his only remaining card: he essentially
renounced the ICTR’s jurisdictional primacy in favor of the ICC’s
model of complementarity.230 Under complementarity, a case (or
situation)231 is admissible to the ICC where a state is “unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or

Politics of State Non-Cooperation, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN
AFRICA 29–36 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008).
228. See PESKIN, supra note 45, at 3–24, 235-57. For a legal discussion of state
cooperation, see ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 160, at 456–76.
229. Carla Del Ponte, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 21
(translation provided by Author); see also Carla Del Ponte, Reflections Based on the ICTY’s
Experience, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME
STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 129 (Robert Bellelli ed., 2010). Similarly, the former ICTY
President wrote in 2004:
[T]he truth is evident: international courts must accommodate themselves to
the political environment, whether we like it or not. The truth must not be
denied, as is so poignantly illustrated by the current problems in cooperation
between the ICTR and the Kigali Government, and between the ICTY and
certain states in the Balkans . . . .
Jorda, supra note 1, at 579–80.
230. See Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 1. See generally Mohamed M. El Zeidy,
The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law,
23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869 (2002) (critiquing the prospects for complementarity at the
ICC).
231. The ICC prosecutor’s investigation begins with a more general “situation” and
progresses to a concrete “case” involving identified suspects. See Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation of the Republic of Kenya, Case No.
ICC-01/09, ¶ 41 (Mar. 31, 2010) (clarifying that an investigation begins as a “situation”
before reaching the status of a “case”). Even though the Statute uses the term “case” in
discussing admissibility, Rome Statute, supra note 205, art. 17, one pre-trial chamber
recently held that admissibility determinations also apply to “situations.” Situation in
Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation of the Republic of Kenya, ¶¶ 45–48. On the distinction
between situations and cases, see, for example, Rod Rastan, What is a “Case” for the
Purpose of the Rome Statute? 19 CRIM. L.F. 435 (2008).
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prosecution.”232 This “unwillingness” prong has sparked
considerable debate over how the ICC should treat nonprosecutorial mechanisms such as Kenya’s incipient truth
commission233 and the Acholi reconciliation ceremonies in
northern Uganda.234 To date, there has not been much academic
or policy discussions of how the ICC should determine
unwillingness in the context of domestic trials,235 partly because
the ICC has yet to face this situation.236 Yet, as both the ICC
Statute and the Gakurazo trial demonstrate, such determinations
will be anything but straightforward.
The ICC Statute provides some guidance on what constitutes
unwillingness, but leaves room for both judicial interpretation
and prosecutorial discretion.237 The Statute sets forth three tests
for determining unwillingness:
232. Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 17. Yet, as William Schabas has observed,
“The term ‘complementarity’ may be somewhat of a misnomer, because what is
established is a relationship between international justice and national justice that is far
from ‘complementary.’ Rather, the two systems function in opposition and to some
extent hostility with respect to each other.” WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 67 (1st ed. 2001).
233. See Lydiah Kemunto Bosire, Misconceptions I—The ICC and the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission (Oxford Transitional Justice Research, Working Papers Series
No. 15), available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Bosire_.pdf; see also SCHABAS,
supra note 232, at 68–69 (discussing debate over truth commissions during drafting of
ICC statute).
234. See, e.g., Tim Allen, Ritual (Ab)use? Problems with Traditional Justice in Northern
Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 47, 47–54
(Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008); Marieke Wierda & Michael Otim, Justice at
Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda, in COURTING
CONFLICT?, supra, at 21, 21–28.
235. See Jennifer S. Easterday, Deciding the Fate of Complementarity: A Colombian Case
Study, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 51–52 (2009) (arguing that the Justice and Peace
Law demonstrates Colombia’s unwillingness to prosecute human rights abusers and
calling for ICC involvement); Gregory S. McNeal, ICC Inability Determinations in Light of
the Dujail Case, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325 (2007) (examining complementarity in
light of the practice at the Iraqi High Tribunal).
236. This may change if Kenya begins national prosecutions. See Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the situation of the Republic of Kenya, Case No.
ICC-01/09, ¶¶ 53–54 (Mar. 31, 2010); Press Conference, ICC, Press Conference by the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo (Nov. 26, 2009),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/
ac13413d-d097-4527-b0ae-60cf6dbb1b68/281313/lmointrostatement26112009_2_2.pdf.
237. See Rome Statute, supra note 208, arts. 17–18, 53. While article 17’s criteria for
admissibility are addressed to the Court, the prosecutor is obliged to consider
admissibility when deciding whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution. Id. arts.
17, 53.
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In order to determine unwillingness in a particular
case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the
principles of due process recognized by international law,
whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken . . .
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court . . . ;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the
proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being
conducted independently or impartially, and they
were or are being conducted in a manner which,
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent
to bring the person concerned to justice.238

The first test will be difficult to meet as it requires a showing
of the state’s subjective intent in bringing the proceedings. By
contrast, the second test is more objective as it looks only to
whether there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings.
Although the Statute does not define an “unjustified” delay, the
ICC is likely to look to international human rights law on what
constitutes a speedy trial.239 Nevertheless, this test is not much
help when it comes to judging domestic proceedings once they
are already underway.240 The most useful test then for uncovering
238. Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 17(2). For a more detailed and somewhat
different interpretation of this provision, see HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE TRIGGERING
PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 150–54 (2005). Article 17(1)(c)
refers to article 20(3) which makes an exception to the prohibition against double
jeopardy (ne bis in idem) for ICC prosecutions where the national proceedings:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international
law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 20(3).
239. For relevant international case law, see ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Informal
Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice, at 36, ICC Doc. ICC-01/04-01/071008-AnxA (Mar. 30, 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc654724.pdf.
240. After all, the threat of international proceedings was expected to kick-start
domestic proceedings, perhaps after an unjustified delay.
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non-genuine (or sham) proceedings is the third, which requires
both an objective determination of non-independence (or
partiality) and a more subjective finding that the proceedings are
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.” Under all three tests, however, the ICC must look
beyond whether the domestic proceedings conform to fair trial
standards and examine whether they were “genuine.”241
The ICC Statute is unclear about whether the Court should
look more to process or result in determining whether a specific
domestic trial is genuine or not. As two legal scholars rightly
note:
The language of the Rome Statute seems to indicate that a
result that shields the accused from justice would be
impermissible, yet it makes reference only to the
“proceedings” to determine willingness to prosecute. It is
therefore difficult to tell if the Court’s decision would be
based on the process undertaken or the final verdict reached
or sentence given.242

An expert panel on complementarity, convened by the
prosecutor in 2003, insisted that an assessment must be based on
“procedural and institutional factors, not the substantive outcome.”243
The panel also pointed out that the prosecutor bears the burden
of proof for showing that domestic proceedings are not genuine,
and that there should be “a policy of giving the benefit of the
doubt to States exercising jurisdiction and assuming that they are
acting in good faith.”244
Fundamentally, it is harder to prove a sham trial (one
designed to acquit) than the more common show trial (one
designed to convict). Show trials usually fall foul of fair trial
standards, whereas sham trials may entail an excess of due process

241. See SCHABAS, supra note 232, at 67 (noting that the “enigmatic adjective
‘genuinely’ [in article 17] is left entirely to the appreciation of the court”). For
discussions of “genuinely,” see Informal Expert Paper, supra note 239, at 8–9, and El-Zeidy,
supra note 230, at 900–01.
242. William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice:
The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation
(Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 08-13, 2008) (footnotes omitted).
243. Informal Expert Paper, supra note 239, at 14.
244. Id. at 16–17.
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for the accused. The expert panel recognized the difficulty of
proving that domestic proceedings are not genuine:
To demonstrate “unwillingness” may be technically difficult
(likely involving inferences and circumstantial evidence) and
politically sensitive (amounting to an accusation against the
authorities). It is possible that a regime may employ
sophisticated schemes to cover up involvement and to
whitewash crimes, so information and analytic tools are
needed to penetrate such tactics.245

Consequently, the panel provided the prosecutor with a fourpage list of factors to consider in assessing unwillingness.246
Several legal theorists worry that complementarity does not
give sufficient deference to national (or local-level) proceedings.
For Mark Drumbl, the concern is that the ICC will crowd out
alternative, nonprosecutorial mechanisms for truth seeking,
justice, and reparations, such as truth commissions.247
Consequently, he proposes the ICC give “qualified deference” to
national and local mechanisms.248 On the other hand, William
Burke-White fears that states are passing the buck for prosecuting
international crimes to the ICC.249 To counter this, he
recommends “proactive complementarity”: the ICC should “use
political leverage to encourage states to undertake their own
prosecutions of international crimes.”250
245. Id. at 14.
246. Id. at 28–31.
247. Mark A. Drumbl, Policy Through Complementarity: The Atrocity Trial as
Justice (Sept. 15, 2009) (unpublished) (arguing that “complementarity may encourage
heterogeneity in terms of the number of institutions adjudicating international crimes,
but it encourages homogeneity in terms of the process they follow and the punishment
they mete out. Complementarity, as operationalized in [ICC] admissibility
determinations, promotes the iconic status of the courtroom and the jailhouse as the
best practice to promote justice in the aftermath of grave mass violence.”); see also
SCHABAS, supra note 232, at 68; Informal Expert Paper, supra note 239, at 22–23.
248. Drumbl, supra note 247. According to him, “Qualified deference creates a
rebuttable presumption in favor of local or national institutions that, unlike
complementarity, does not search for procedural symmetry between their process and
liberal criminal procedure and, unlike primacy, does not explicitly impose liberal
criminal procedure.” Id.
249. See Burke-White, supra note 14, at 59.
250. Id. at 54. See generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: the
Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255 (2008)
(arguing that complementarity will encourage national trials that lack due process);
Carsten Stahn, Complementarity: a Tale of Two Notions, 19 CRIM. L.F. 87 (2008)
(contrasting “classical” and “positive” complementarity).
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While sharing some of Drumbl and Burke-White’s concerns,
this Author worries more that the ICC will give too much
deference to national proceedings, not too little. The political
reality is that the ICC has very little power vis-à-vis states. This
weakness partly explains why complementarity has been
something of a bust so far. The ICC’s architects assumed the
court would prod states to do genuine, domestic prosecutions to
preclude the court from exercising jurisdiction. They counted on
targeted states being jealous guardians of their national
sovereignty.251 However, the ICC prosecutor, Luis MorenoOcampo, turned this thinking on its head. He “adopted a policy
of inviting voluntary referrals from states to increase the
likelihood of important cooperation and support on the
ground.”252 The governments of the Central African Republic,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda proved only too
happy to make “self-referrals” to the ICC.253 Self-referrals offer
251. See, e.g., ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 164 (2005) (predicting that “States,
particularly in relation to offenses by their nationals, are more likely to prefer to
investigate at the national level, rather than have an investigation proceeded with in
public by an independent international investigator”). States may prefer to conduct
national investigations of their own officials or armed forces, but they seem more than
willing to let the international community investigate nationals who belong to armed
rebel movements.
252. ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Report on the Activities Performed During the First
Three Years (June 2003–June 2006), at 2 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/d76a5d89-fb64-47a9-9821-725747378ab2/143680/
otp_3yearreport20060914_english.pdf; see also Peskin, supra note 15, at 656–57. This
approach seemed to contradict the view the prosecutor espoused on taking office. On
that occasion, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated that “the absence of trials
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions,
would be a major success.” Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Ceremony for
the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 2
(June
16,
2003),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/
d7572226-264a-4b6b-85e3-2673648b4896/143585/
030616_moreno_ocampo_english.pdf. Referrals involve country situations rather than
individual cases. See Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years, supra, at
7.
253. Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in Uganda
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE
ICC IN AFRICA, supra note 220, at 37, 37–46; William A. Schabas, ‘Complementarity in
Practice’: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L.F. 5, 16 (2008). Schabas also
questions whether self-referral is authorized and compatible with the Rome Statute. Id.
at 12–18; see also William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International
Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557, 559 (2005).
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states several political advantages: they enhance the states’
reputation for international cooperation; they significantly
diminish the likelihood that state officials will be indicted by the
ICC; they shift the financial and political costs of investigations
and prosecutions to the international community; and, most
importantly, they marginalize and pressure their political
enemies (i.e., rebel leaders) through international arrest
warrants.254
Partly as a result of these self-referrals, the ICC has had no
experience with complementary national trials.255 The RPF trial
provides one scenario for what a complementary proceeding
might look like. There, as was meant to happen with the ICC, the
threat of an international indictment helped spur a reluctant
state to conduct its own national trial.256 Even if the ICTR
prosecutor had fulfilled his promise to evaluate whether Rwanda
had “effectively and fairly prosecuted” the case (instead of
focusing solely on fairness), he might well have concluded the
proceedings were genuine under Article 17(2)(c) of the Rome
Statute.257 On the surface, the proceedings appeared to be
“conducted independently and impartially”; that is, the military
judges showed no obvious bias in the courtroom or in the
judgment.258 Similarly, the proceedings did not seem evidently
254. See Burke-White, supra note 14, at 62–63; Antonio Cassesse, Is the ICC Still
Having Teething Problems? 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 434, 436 (2006); Peskin, supra note 15, at
678; Schabas, supra note 253, at 33. Drumbl makes some of these points, albeit more
tentatively. Drumbl, supra note 247, at 19.
255. Arguably, the national courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo were
willing and able to try the three rebel leaders indicted by the ICC prosecutor. As Schabas
damningly observes, the Congolese courts would have prosecuted Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo for more serious crimes than the ICC is doing. Schabas, supra note 253, at 23–25.
But see Géraldine Mattioli & Anneke van Woudenberg, Global Catalyst for National
Prosecutions? The ICC in the Democratic Republic of Congo in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE,
PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA, supra note 227, at 55, 55–64.
256. Though, as argued above, the Rwandan government was prodded more by
other political considerations; namely, its desire for transfers of Rwandan genocide
suspects and the French and Spanish arrest warrants against high-ranking RPF political
and military figures.
257. Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 17.
258. Perhaps there should be a rebuttable presumption of bias when a military
court in a military dictatorship tries members of the military. As Broomhall observes, the
risk of sham proceedings “will be particularly great where police, security forces or the
military are subject to their own courts . . . .” BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
RULE OF LAW 90 (2004).
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“inconsistent with an intent to bring” the two commanding
officers to justice: the military prosecutor and court mainly
applied the correct legal test for command responsibility and the
prosecutor presented (limited and unconvincing) evidence that
the commanding officers should have known of the threat posed
to the clergy.
To make the argument that the RPF trial was actually a
sham, it is necessary to look at evidence outside the proceedings
(looking beyond the trial record)—the widespread and notorious
nature of RPF massacres and Human Rights Watch’s own factual
investigation—and challenge the Rwandan military prosecutor’s
theory of the case. The ICC prosecutor and judges are no more
likely to do this than the ICTR prosecutor.259 Under
complementarity, the ICC has an institutional bias to defer to
national proceedings by its states parties.260 It will not want to
jeopardize relations with state parties on whose cooperation it
depends.261 In addition, the ICC is not meant to act as a court of
259. The expert panel’s incredibly detailed suggestions for fact-finding and
analyzing “unwillingness” will probably prove to be an exercise in wishful thinking
because of political and resource constraints. See ICC, supra note 239, at 11–14, 28–31.
260. The ICC has not deferred to national proceedings in Sudan, which is not a
party to the Rome Statute. The Sudanese government established the Special Criminal
Court on the Events in Darfur (“SCCED”) the day after the ICC prosecutor opened his
investigation into Darfur. See Decree Establishing the Special Criminal Court on the
Events in Darfur (June 7, 2005), in Letter dated 18 June 2005 from the Chargé d’affaire
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2005/403 (June 22, 2005). The
SCCED has been widely criticized for failing to provide meaningful justice. See, e.g.,
Human Rights Watch, Lack of Conviction: The Special Criminal Court on the Events in
Darfur, June 2006, available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/sudan0606/
sudan0606.pdf; Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Sudan: New Report Shows Courts & Investigations
Fail to Bring Justice to Victims in Darfur, Oct. 28, 2007; Elizabeth Rubin, If Not Peace, Then
Justice, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 2, 2006, at 42.
261. See ICC, supra note 239, at 3 (“Cooperative States should generally benefit
from a presumption of bona fides and baseline levels of scrutiny . . . .”). For example,
the ICC Statute allows the ICC to assist states with their investigations and prosecutions.
Rome Statute, supra note 208, art. 93(10). It has been recognized that this requires
“caution to avoid being exploited in efforts to legitimize or shield inadequate national
efforts from criticism.” Informal Expert Paper, supra note 239, at 7. Zahar and Sluiter
point to the ICTY’s enormous reluctance to use Rule 9(ii) to assert primacy over
domestic proceedings. ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 160, at 455. The wording of ICTY
Rule 9(ii) is very similar to that of article 17(2)(c) of the ICC Statute: it allows the ICTY
prosecutor to request deferral of domestic proceedings where “there is a lack of
impartiality or independence, or the investigations or proceedings are designed to
shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case is not diligently
prosecuted.” ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 9(ii), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.44
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appeal for unsuccessful national prosecutions.262 Thus, the ICC
prosecutor and judges will be reluctant to substitute their theory
of the case and evidentiary findings for those of domestic
actors.263 Finally, the ICC will be loathe to divert resources from
its own investigations and prosecutions to make in-depth
assessments of unwillingness.264 Overall, the ICC, like the ICTR
before it, is likely to prove unable or unwilling to recognize sham
national proceedings designed to shield perpetrators from
justice.
C. Victor’s Justice
Following his determination that the RPF trial was fair, the
prosecutor indicated that he would not issue any indictments for
other RPF crimes. In response to questions during his June 2009
Security Council appearance, Jallow stated that “my Office does
not have an indictment that is ready in respect of [RPF]
allegations at this particular stage.”265 He subsequently offered
three rationales for not bringing any RPF prosecutions:
It’s not that the OTP [Office of the Prosecutor] is reluctant
to do its work, but its work has to be based on acceptable
evidence presented by credible witnesses which offers us a
reasonable chance of success. And we also then have to take
into account other factors, issues of reconciliation, the fact
that . . . there is actually a lot of work which we ought to do

(Dec. 10, 2009). There appears to be only one instance where the ICTY prosecutor
invoked Rule 9(ii), but the trial chamber did not rule on that specific point. ZAHAR &
SLUITER, supra note 160, at 451.
262. See, e.g., ICC, supra note 239, at 16 (stating that “[t]he standard for assessing
‘genuineness’ should reflect appropriate deference to national systems as well as the fact
that the ICC is not an international court of appeal, nor is it a human rights body
designed to monitor all imperfections of legal systems”).
263. Before agreeing on the term “genuinely,” the drafters of article 17 rejected
the term “effectively” “because of a concern that the ICC might judge a legal system
against a perfectionist standard (for example, that the ICC might set aside proceedings
because, in the Court’s opinion, the prosecution might have chosen a more effective
strategy). Id. at 8 n.9.
264. See El-Zeidy, supra note 230, at 899 (predicting that “[t]he nature of the
‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ tests will in many cases demand greater resources of the
prosecutor in preparing the admissibility argument than proving the guilt of the alleged
perpetrator”). This is also unwittingly demonstrated by the expert panel’s lengthy
investigative checklist for uncovering unwillingness. ICC, supra note 239, at 28–31.
265. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4,
2009).
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also on the major crime base [i.e., genocide] which we are
still unable to do.266

In other words, the prosecutor’s office does not have “acceptable
evidence” to bring RPF indictments and will not gather more
evidence because its priorities are genocide cases. And even if it
did acquire “acceptable evidence” in the future, it would turn the
case over to the Rwandan government for prosecution in the
interests of “national reconciliation” as it did with that of the
clergy massacre.
It is now clear the ICTR will not bring any indictments, let
alone proceedings, for RPF crimes,267 and it will remain satisfied
with the Rwandan military having prosecuted just one war crimes
case.268 By failing to prosecute any RPF crimes, the ICTR has
rendered “victor’s justice”269 in the sense that it has only
prosecuted the losing side of Rwanda’s civil war. To put it more
starkly, it has only tried Hutu defendants (with the exception of
one European). This sets the ICTR apart from the ICTY and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, which have prosecuted
individuals from all sides of those conflicts.270
Rwanda offers perhaps the most sympathetic case for
“victor’s justice” because the victor’s crimes are dwarfed by the
loser’s crimes. As Rwanda’s prosecutor general wrote, “it was the
RPF that had to contend with the génocidaires as Rwanda was
266. Hassan B. Jallow, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra note 86, at 15.
267. Filip Reyntjens came to this conclusion several years earlier when the
December 2004 deadline for ICTR investigations passed without any announcement of
RPF indictments. Letter from Filip Reyntjens, Professor, University of Antwerp, to
Hassan B. Jallow, ICTR Prosecutor (Jan. 11, 2005) (on file with author). In protest, he
withdrew as an expert witness for the prosecution. Id.
268. Jallow’s claim that the Rwandan military prosecutor has prosecuted “up to two
dozen senior military officers,” U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.6134 (June 4, 2009), is highly disingenuous as none of those prosecutions (apart
from the clergy massacre) were for war crimes and most of the murder cases involved
low-ranking soldiers. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
269. Thierry Cruvellier provocatively refers to the ICTR as “loser’s justice” because
it was run by the U.N. and international community, which had lost their credibility in
1994 by failing to stop the genocide. CRUVELLIER, supra note 44, at 164-67. Still, it was
the Tribunal’s very weakness that enabled the RPF to use it for accomplishing victor’s
justice.
270. For a breakdown of ICTY prosecutions by sides, see Haskell & Waldorf, supra
note 201, at 17. On the Special Court for Sierra Leone, see, for example, Thierry
Cruvellier, Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, From the Taylor Trial to a Lasting Legacy:
Putting the Special Court Model to the Test, at 24–28, June 2009, available at http://ictj.org/
static/Publications/ICTJ_SLE_TaylorTrialtoLastingLegacy_pb2009.pdf.
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abandoned by the international community, and any crimes the
RPF may have committed in doing so paled in comparison to the
crimes committed by the génocidaires.”271 From that perspective,
even-handedness may appear morally dubious insofar as it
suggests an equivalency between genocide and RPF crimes. The
ICTR prosecutor essentially made this argument in his spirited
response to criticism from Human Rights Watch:
I do not share your views that the Tribunal will be seen to
deliver victors [sic] justice unless the members of the RPF
are prosecuted at the ICTR. The [ICTR] has understandably
focused for many years [on] the genocide as this is the main
crime base of its mandate.272

Several prominent legal scholars have also challenged the notion
of victor’s justice. William Schabas dismisses it as “an empty
slogan, based upon unproven hypotheses and a lot of
conjecture.”273 Mark Drumbl also questions “whether victor’s
justice necessarily taints the legitimacy of law.”274
Here, I want to take up Schabas’ challenge to engage in
“much closer scrutiny of the idea that [victor’s justice] is causing
some great harm.”275 Let me state at the outset what I mean by
the term. Victor’s justice is an extreme form of selective
prosecution which occurs when only members of the losing side
are prosecuted.276 I am not suggesting the ICTR could have, or
should have, rendered equal justice. The goal is not parity (i.e.,
indicting equal numbers of suspects from each side of the
conflict), but rather some measure of impartiality. In other
271. Ngoga, supra note 26, at 331. This bears a marked resemblance to Kenneth
Anderson’s argument that the right to administer universal justice must be morally
earned: “You didn’t intervene—but you still have the right to conduct a trial? On what
moral basis, pray? Your prudence or your cowardice?” Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of
International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L
L. 331, 338–39 (2009).
272. June 22, 2009 Letter from Jallow to Roth, supra note 134 at 3.
273. PhD Studies in Human Rights, http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/
(Aug. 16, 2009, 06:48); see also William A. Schabas, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors,
supra note 86, at 26.
274. Mark A. Drumbl, Book Review, 20 CRIM. L.F. 495, 498 (2009) (reviewing
PESKIN, supra note 45) (internal citations omitted).
275. Remarks of William A. Schabas, Remarks at Debates with Prosecutors, supra
note 86, at 26. Given space constraints, I can only briefly sketch a response to Schabas; a
fuller argument can be found in Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 201, at 19–27.
276. Both victors’ tribunals (such as the Nuremberg tribunal) and nonvictors’
tribunals (such as the ICTR) can produce victor’s justice.
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words, if the ICTR had prosecuted just one RPF soldier (even a
low-ranking one), then it could be criticized for unfairness, but
not for victor’s justice.
Victor’s justice at the ICTR does harm to victims as well as to
international norms and institutions.277 Victor’s justice unjustly
discriminates among victims. As Des Forges wrote in her last
Human Rights Watch report:
To insist on the right to justice for all victims, as did the
[1994] UN Commission of Experts, is not to deny the
genocide, nor does such an insistence equate war crimes with
genocide; it simply asserts that all victims, regardless of their
affiliation, regardless of the nature of the crime committed
against them, and regardless of the affiliation of the
perpetrator, must have equal opportunity to seek redress for
the wrongs done them.278

Des Forges’ statement is grounded in fundamental human rights
tenets—dignity, equality, and universality—and reflects recent
developments in human rights norms, such as the U.N.
principles on justice and reparations for victims of gross human
rights violations.279 If there is no hierarchy of suffering—if, that
is, victims of RPF crimes suffer just as much as victims of the
genocide—then no group of victims are more deserving of justice
than another.280
Even if there is an equality of suffering among victims, there
may still be a hierarchy of harm from the international
community’s perspective.281 This is reflected in the usual

277. For other arguments, see Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 201, at 19–27.
278. Human Rights Watch, supra note 21, at 90.
279. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/147/Annex (Mar. 21, 2006); Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/34/Annex
(Nov. 29, 1985).
280. Of course, the political reality is that “[s]ome victims count more than
others,” BASS, supra note 42, at 278. But that does not negate the moral argument that
all victims should count equally.
281. As Schabas states:
Of course there is a sense in which all such crimes are equivalent. The victims
of these atrocities—and I am not gainsaying that Dresden and the RPF
reprisals were not atrocities—suffer every bit as much. For that matter, it is
hardly the concern of a victim whether they suffer as a result of genocide or a
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taxonomy of international crimes that places genocide (the
“crime of crimes”) at the apex. As one legal scholar explained,
“genocide poses more harm than crimes against humanity or war
crimes because of the explicit intent to destroy a group, the
discrimination animating the perpetrator’s action, and the
implicit element of collective action inherent in the commission
of the crime.”282 International case law seems divided on this
score. The ICTR jurisprudence is simply inconsistent,283 while the
ICTY Appeals Chamber has ruled that “there is in law no
distinction between the seriousness of a crime against humanity
and that of a war crime.”284 Assuming for argument’s sake that
this hierarchy does exist, it still does not determine the
comparative gravity when specific crimes are at issue.285 Is one
instance of incitement to genocide really more grave than the
murder (as a war crime) of thirteen clergy and two other
civilians? The ICTR prosecutor essentially implied that genocide
crimes are always more grave than war crimes when he defended
his decision not to indict any RPF war crimes.
Second, victor’s justice harms the legitimacy of international
tribunals and international criminal law because their (postNuremberg) justification rests, in part, on claims that they are
more impartial (i.e., more cosmopolitan) than national tribunals
and domestic criminal law. International tribunals applying
international criminal law should more closely approximate the
rule of law (liberal legalism)—with its emphasis on procedural
garden-variety murder. But obviously other concerns are afoot when we are
dealing with international criminal justice.
PhD Studies in Human Rights, http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/ (Aug. 16,
2009, 06:48)
282. Alliston Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International
Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 483 (2001).
283. Compare Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and
Sentence, ¶ 981 (Jan. 27, 2000) (opining that “genocide constitutes the ‘crime of
crimes’”), and Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 53 (July 9,
2004) (same), with Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment, ¶ 590
(May 26, 2003) (insisting that “there is no hierarchy of crimes under the Statute”).
284. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-A bis, Judgment in
Sentencing Appeals, ¶ 69 (Jan. 26, 2000). But see Schabas, supra note 253, at 26 (arguing
that international criminal law does create a hierarchy of crimes).
285. In assessing gravity, prosecutors and judges need to look to specific contexts
rather than abstract hierarchies. See Danner, supra note 282, at 463 n.196, 477–78
(providing possible methods of assessing gravity of crimes and arguing that crimes
should be viewed differently based on the context in which it was committed,
respectively).
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fairness and equality before the law—than domestic courts
applying domestic criminal law. By failing to do this,
international tribunals undermine the expressive justification for
international criminal law and hence weaken the diffusion of
liberal legalist norms.286 This is what makes the ICC prosecutor’s
one-sided prosecutions against non-state actors in the Central
African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Uganda so worrying.287
CONCLUSION
Rwanda—a small, weak state—has skillfully played the ICTR
to enhance both its international and national ambitions at the
expense of the international community.288 This demonstrates
just how easy it is for states to hijack international criminal justice
mechanisms and turn them into a continuation of (civil) war by
other means. Rwanda’s neighbors have learned this lesson only
too well. The Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic
286. Drumbl argues that “the most plausible aspiration of international criminal
law” is “an expressive, norm-generating social constructivism” rather than “concrete
deterrence [or] hard retribution.” Drumbl, supra note 274, at 498. Yet, it is hard to
reconcile this eminently sensible position with his claim that:
indiscriminately prosecuting all sides to a conflict is no guarantor of legitimacy
either. When the SCSL [Special Court of Sierra Leone] Appeals Chamber
ruled that “fighting for a just cause” could not serve as a mitigating factor in
sentencing in the [Civil Defence Forces] case, it may have upheld the
neutrality of the law but it also contradicted the way many Sierra Leoneans
perceive the aggregated gravity of the violence.
Id. This seems to conflate institutional legitimacy with popular opinion. In addition, it
unfairly characterizes impartial prosecutions as “indiscriminately prosecuting all sides.”
Id. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the key debate between the majority and the
dissenting judge (a Sierra Leone national) in the Civil Defence Forces (“CDF”) appeal
case was over sentencing mitigation—not over whether the CDF should have been
prosecuted in the first place. See Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14A, Judgment, ¶¶ 513–35 (May 28, 2008); see also Cruvellier, From the Taylor Trial to a

Lasting Legacy: Putting the Special Court Model to the Test, supra note 270, at 24–28
(discussing the CDF trial and mitigating factors).
287. The exception so far has been the prosecutor’s indictments against several
parties to the Darfur conflict, including Sudan’s president and several rebel leaders. See
ICC,
Situation
in
Darfur,
Sudan,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/
situations+and+cases/situations/situation+icc+0205/. This different (and far more
impartial) approach is due to the fact that the Darfur situation was a referral from the
U.N. Security Council, rather than a self-referral from a state party.
288. This undercuts the overly simplistic, realist argument that international
criminal trials “are used by strong nations to assert their international ambitions at the
expense of weak nations.” Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law,
55 DUKE L.J. 75, 147 (2005).
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of Congo, and Uganda have used self-referrals to the
International Criminal Court to enhance their international
prestige while ensuring that victor’s justice is imposed on their
enemies.289 The ICC prosecutor, desperate for state cooperation,
has been only too eager to oblige. If and when the time comes
for the ICC to “judge” complementary national trials, Rwanda’s
trial of the clergy massacre strongly suggests that the ICC will be
unwilling or unable to recognize sham domestic national
proceedings designed to shield the accused, not least because the
ICC is even more reliant on state cooperation than the ICTR.
Given his dependence on states, what is an international
prosecutor to do? Rwanda had made clear it was never going to
cooperate with an RPF prosecution by handing over suspects or
evidence to the Tribunal. It had also shown it could shut down
the Tribunal’s genocide trials by stopping the flow of witnesses
and not face any meaningful international censure. At that point,
the ICTR prosecutor should have publicly stated that without
Security Council pressure to force Rwandan cooperation, the
Tribunal would produce victor’s justice. That would have placed
the onus back where it really belonged—on the international
community that had created the Tribunal’s mandate in the first
place. Instead, the prosecutor allowed Rwanda to hold a
domestic trial for the clergy massacre and then proclaimed it
satisfactory. He chose to acquiesce in a pretense of justice rather
than recognize an absence of justice. That choice not only
tarnishes the Tribunal’s real accomplishments, it also sets a
terrible precedent for the future of international justice.

289. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. Again, this punctures Posner’s
realist argument that “international criminal tribunals will similarly look like efforts by
the governments that influence the prosecutor and judges—whether the Security
Council (in ad hoc cases) or the members of the ICC—to harass or embarrass states with
contrary foreign policy objectives.” Posner, supra note 288, at 149.

